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7 - INFERENCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Ronnie Cann
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
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Summary

Making inferences

The semantic theory developed up to Chapter 6 has concentrated mainly on the interpretation of sentences and phrases in isolation from each other, but one of the criteria for assessing the adequacy of a semantic theory set out in Chapter 1 is that it should account for the meaning relations that hold between different expressions in a language. This means, amongst other things, that the semantic theory proposed here ought to guarantee that, where reference and context are kept constant, the sentences in (1.b) and (1.c) are paraphrases of (1.a) while (1.d) and (1.e) are entailments of it and (1.f) and (1.g) are contradictions of it.

  1. a. Jo stroked the cat and kicked the dog.

  2. b. Jo kicked the dog and stroked the cat.

  3. c. The cat was stroked by Jo and the dog was kicked by Jo.

  4. d. Jo stroked the cat.

  5. e. Someone kicked the dog.

  6. f. The dog wasn't kicked.

  7. g. No-one stroked anything.

The intuitively identified relations between the sentences in (1) derive from the interpretations of the conjunction and, the negative not and the quantifier pronouns no-one and someone. Such relations are generally referred to as logical entailments, paraphrases or contradictions. (Note that these terms are used ambiguously between the relation that holds amongst sentences, as here, and the product sentences themselves, as in the first paragraph above.)

Type
Chapter
Information
Formal Semantics
An Introduction
, pp. 197 - 232
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1993

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  • INFERENCE
  • Ronnie Cann, University of Edinburgh
  • Book: Formal Semantics
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139166317.008
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  • INFERENCE
  • Ronnie Cann, University of Edinburgh
  • Book: Formal Semantics
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139166317.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • INFERENCE
  • Ronnie Cann, University of Edinburgh
  • Book: Formal Semantics
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139166317.008
Available formats
×