4 - East German military/security involvement in Africa

Summary

Introduction

As previously noted, Western analysts have suggested that an increased East German military/security involvement in Africa from the mid-1970s onwards was connected with the GDR's desire to secure preferential economic treatment from the USSR and maintain Moscow's support with regard to the German question. Although, of course, these linkages are impossible to verify, it is argued here that, especially after 1971, in line with its affiliation strategy with the USSR, the GDR was eager to despatch military and security ‘advisers’ and military ‘technicians’, in particular, to Africa. But some sources have also referred to deployments of combat units of the GDR's National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee – NVA) in Africa in this period. Other reports have indicated substantial East German arms exports to the African continent. It will be demonstrated that these claims also have some substance, especially with reference to arms transfers from the GDR.

Undoubtedly, with the destabilisation of southern Africa and the Horn of Africa in the 1970s, opportunities for military intervention by states of the Socialist Community were presented, and in these circumstances the USSR appreciated the value especially of East German and Cuban assistance. The USSR could pursue its specific goals in Africa at this time – such as enlarging influence at Western and Chinese expense, gaining international recognition of its superpower status, and acquiring refuelling and repair facilities for its blue-water navy – at reduced economic and military manpower costs, and with less political danger of antagonising the West.

However, the value of an East German military/security profile in Africa as a legitimising tool was circumscribed. An appreciation of this role was reserved solely for policy-makers in the Kremlin.