Part I - 1942: Climax in the Mediterranean

Summary

Planning and Policy

The post of Fifth Sea Lord and with it the Fleet Air Arm's representation on the Board of Admiralty was suspended upon the controversial appointment of Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer, an officer with no aviation experience, to the post of Chief of Naval Air Services on 11 July 1942 [66]. Rear Admiral Lyster, the previous Fifth Sea Lord, became Rear Admiral, Home Fleet Aircraft Carriers. It was announced on 15 December 1942 that this unsatisfactory arrangement was to be brought to an end by the appointment of Rear Admiral Denis Boyd, formerly Rear Admiral, Mediterranean Aircraft Carriers and Captain of Illustrious at the time of the Taranto raid, as Fifth Sea Lord from 14 January 1943 [126].

The estimates of aircraft carrier requirements at the beginning of 1942 indicated that the biggest gap would occur with carriers to operate with the Fleet [3] and the limitations of naval forces without carriers were fully appreciated [17]. There was a growing realisation, fuelled by unfavourable comparisons with Japanese carriers [5, 30, 32, 32a], that to increase the numbers of carriers operating with the Fleet, simpler designs than the armoured Fleet Carriers were required [5]. In October, The Rt Hon. A.V. Alexander, the First Lord, acknowledged that less than half the required number of Fleet Carriers were available [95]. As a result proposals were put forward for the construction of Intermediate Aircraft Carriers, later known as Light Fleet Carriers, at the expense of a number of cruisers and conversion of the battleship Vanguard [52] and to replace the proposed construction of three cruisers with three Intermediate Carriers [88]. The aircraft repair ship Unicorn was to be commissioned as an operational carrier with only one-third of the complement of repair staff. It would take three months for the ship to reach full repair capacity once operations had been completed [85, 85a].

The lack of Fleet Carriers in the spring of 1942 saw consideration being given to approaching President Roosevelt for the loan of American ships, but Captain Lambe, the Director of Plans, recommended that given the threat faced by the Americans in the Pacific no such request should be made [34]. By the end of the year the situation was rather different with an assessment being made as to whether any British carriers could be spared for the South-West Pacific [106, 106a].