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Part I - Micro- and macro-prudential regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2015

Ester Faia
Affiliation:
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
Andreas Hackethal
Affiliation:
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
Michael Haliassos
Affiliation:
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
Katja Langenbucher
Affiliation:
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
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Financial Regulation
A Transatlantic Perspective
, pp. 1 - 192
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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References

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