APPENDIX D - GNEISENAU TO ALEXANDER, 24 NOVEMBER 1813

Summary

I. As long as Holland remains under enemy control there can be no security for North Germany and the army, which is assigned to either observe the Rhine or to cross it, will be driven back to inner Germany at the moment the enemy enjoys success elsewhere and is in the position to send an army to Holland and, supported by the strongholds of this land, invade Westphalia. On the other hand, if we take Holland, any offensive in North Germany will be taken in the flank by our army in Holland and this army can be supported instantaneously since we control the sea.

II. Belgian and Holland are the wealthiest states on the continent. If we do not attempt to wrest these states from the enemy he will thus be able to extract from them manpower, money, and military supplies. These resources can be ours if we do not delay to take them for ourselves.

III. France is surrounded by 100–140 fortresses. These places, once the bulwark of the Empire, have in the current circumstances become an immeasurable burden. All of these places in their current condition are depleted of manpower, munitions, and supplies of all kinds and to outfit them is a definite impossibility for France. Therefore, instead of fearing and avoiding these fortresses, we must place ourselves right in their midst and threaten them all.