Book contents
- The Ethics of Social Punishment
- The Ethics of Social Punishment
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Notes on Contributors
- Preface
- Part I The Descartes Lectures 2018
- Part II Commentaries
- Chapter 4 How to Do Things with Blame (and Social Punishment)
- Chapter 5 On Social Punishment
- Chapter 6 Punishment and Protest
- Part III Replies
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 5 - On Social Punishment
from Part II - Commentaries
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 October 2020
- The Ethics of Social Punishment
- The Ethics of Social Punishment
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Notes on Contributors
- Preface
- Part I The Descartes Lectures 2018
- Part II Commentaries
- Chapter 4 How to Do Things with Blame (and Social Punishment)
- Chapter 5 On Social Punishment
- Chapter 6 Punishment and Protest
- Part III Replies
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This essay critically discusses Chapter 2 of Linda Radzik’s 2018 Descartes Lectures. Radzik’s topic in those lectures is social punishment – that is, the familiar practices of criticizing, reprimanding, and withdrawing by which we informally respond to those whom we take to have violated moral norms. Radzik’s aim in her second chapter is to justify social punishment by adapting and extending a prominent approach to legal punishment that combines retributive and consequentialist elements. However, unlike most retributivists, Radzik holds that what the relevant wrongdoers deserve is not any form of suffering but only the coercive violation of certain rights, while, unlike most consequentialists, she holds that the benefit that is crucial to punishment is not deterrence but the moral improvement of the wrongdoer. The current essay discusses some of the problems that are raised by these interesting new proposals.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Ethics of Social PunishmentThe Enforcement of Morality in Everyday Life, pp. 99 - 112Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020