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Chapter 6 - Normative Ethics for Gradualists

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 May 2023

Martin Peterson
Affiliation:
Texas A & M University
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Summary

Mainstream consequentialists believe that an act is right if and only if no alternative brings about better consequences and wrong otherwise. This normative theory is incompatible with the gradualist hypothesis no matter whether “better than” is a complete or incomplete relation on the set of all possible consequences. (If “better than” is an incomplete relation, perhaps because the best alternatives are incomparable or on a par, all undefeated alternatives will be right because no alternative produces better consequences.) The modest aim of this chapter is to investigate how consequentialists could modify their normative theory to render it compatible with the gradualist hypothesis. In this chapter, I explain why I believe multidimensional consequentialism is a good fit with the gradualist hypothesis. I also apply it to some problems in population ethics and show that the gradualist hypothesis can shed new light on problems that mainstream versions of consequentialism are unable to analyze properly. The final section of the chapter responds to some objections to the multidimensional theory.

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Ethics in the Gray Area
A Gradualist Theory of Right and Wrong
, pp. 120 - 143
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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