Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface to the Third Edition
- Preface to the Second Edition
- Preface to the First Edition
- Part I Conceptualissues
- 1 The Neoclassical Problem
- 2 Economic Property Rights
- 3 Transaction Costs
- 4 Information Costs
- 5 The Theory of Economic Property Rights
- Part II Contracts, Organizations, And Institutions
- 6 Exchange, Contracts, and Contract Choice
- 7 Divided Ownership and Organization
- 8 Institutions
- Part III Establishing Property Rights
- 9 Capture in the Public Domain
- 10 Forming Property Rights
- 11 Benefits of the Public Domain
- Part IV Non-Price Allocation And Other Issues
- 12 Nonwage Labor Markets
- 13 Property Rights in Non-market Allocations
- 14 Additional Property Rights Applications
- 15 The Property Rights Model
- References
- Index
- Political Economy of Institutions And Decisions
7 - Divided Ownership and Organization
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 August 2023
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface to the Third Edition
- Preface to the Second Edition
- Preface to the First Edition
- Part I Conceptualissues
- 1 The Neoclassical Problem
- 2 Economic Property Rights
- 3 Transaction Costs
- 4 Information Costs
- 5 The Theory of Economic Property Rights
- Part II Contracts, Organizations, And Institutions
- 6 Exchange, Contracts, and Contract Choice
- 7 Divided Ownership and Organization
- 8 Institutions
- Part III Establishing Property Rights
- 9 Capture in the Public Domain
- 10 Forming Property Rights
- 11 Benefits of the Public Domain
- Part IV Non-Price Allocation And Other Issues
- 12 Nonwage Labor Markets
- 13 Property Rights in Non-market Allocations
- 14 Additional Property Rights Applications
- 15 The Property Rights Model
- References
- Index
- Political Economy of Institutions And Decisions
Summary
When many individuals combine their inputs in production, common property problems arise. Often the use of low incentive wage contracts are necessary to mitigate overuse. However, such contracts mean that workers need direction from others. This is the seed of an organization. The central person in an organization must be able to bare the risks of their decisions, and so the owner of the organization is often the holder of the equity capital, which is used to convince others that they will not bear negative residuals.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Economic Analysis of Property Rights , pp. 110 - 134Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023