Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Table of cases
- Table of legislation
- 1 Introduction
- PART 1 Theories of corporate governance
- PART 2 Supranational regulatory techniques
- 4 Harmonisation
- 5 Negative integration
- 6 Variety and integration: reflexive corporate governance regulation
- PART 3 EC regulation of corporate governance
- 11 Conclusion: the genius of EC corporate governance regulation
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
5 - Negative integration
from PART 2 - Supranational regulatory techniques
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Table of cases
- Table of legislation
- 1 Introduction
- PART 1 Theories of corporate governance
- PART 2 Supranational regulatory techniques
- 4 Harmonisation
- 5 Negative integration
- 6 Variety and integration: reflexive corporate governance regulation
- PART 3 EC regulation of corporate governance
- 11 Conclusion: the genius of EC corporate governance regulation
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
Resolving the political deadlock: direct effect and mutual recognition
In the previous chapter we saw that political agreement on common rules became impossible, effectively blocking the ambitious company law and corporate governance harmonisation programme. Corporate governance regulation was far from the only area to be faced with this problem, leaving the market integration programme – and therefore the EEC's achievement of its goals – in the balance.
As is well known, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) put the market integration process back on track with a series of key decisions. First, it declared freedom of establishment to be directly effective, allowing it to be invoked before the national courts, despite the fact that the programme of measures anticipated by the Treaty had not been introduced. This represented a considerable extension of its 1962 Van Gend en Loos decision, which had given direct effect to ‘a clear and unconditional prohibition, which is not a duty to act, but a duty not to act’. As Craig explains, ‘Article 52 [now Article 43], and the provisions on freedom of establishment, expressly contemplate further action by the legislative organs of the Community and by the Member States in order to effectuate the social and economic aims of this part of the Treaty. The very regime of freedom of establishment involves a complex array of legislative norms in order that these aims can be achieved.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- EC Regulation of Corporate Governance , pp. 146 - 213Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009