
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Bureaucracy and Problem Solving
- 2 The Dual Dynamics of the Administrative State
- 3 The Regulatory Process as an Attention Mechanism
- 4 Problem Monitoring in the Administrative State
- 5 Problem Prioritization and Demand for Information
- 6 Problem Solving and the Supply of Information
- 7 Information, Bureaucracy, and Government Problem Solving
- Appendix A Conceptualization and Measurement
- Appendix B Statistical Models
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
3 - The Regulatory Process as an Attention Mechanism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Bureaucracy and Problem Solving
- 2 The Dual Dynamics of the Administrative State
- 3 The Regulatory Process as an Attention Mechanism
- 4 Problem Monitoring in the Administrative State
- 5 Problem Prioritization and Demand for Information
- 6 Problem Solving and the Supply of Information
- 7 Information, Bureaucracy, and Government Problem Solving
- Appendix A Conceptualization and Measurement
- Appendix B Statistical Models
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Summary
Herbert Simon (1971, pp. 40–41) noted more than forty years ago that information “consumes the attention of its recipients.” The policy-making process generates massive amounts of information, and given the scarce nature of attention, knowing which bits of information to attend to is vitally important for decision making. The regulatory process functions as an attention mechanism, channeling eyes, ears, and resources to important and salient problems. This view of the process is consistent with its creation as a legislative process and its subsequent legislative development. Its value in regard to information processing is also a consistent theme in empirical research on the process of rulemaking.
The legislative development of the regulatory process shows that it was, at its inception, intended to be legislative in nature (Rosenbloom, 2001). This intent shows up in both the substance and procedure of bureaucratic policy making, as well as in the organizational relationship between agencies and units within Congress. In their specialization and functional differentiation, agencies roughly mirror the substantive structure of the committee system. Members of Congress envisioned the regulatory process as an extension of legislative power, and Congress's modifications of the process have both deepened and broadened its influence. In addition to the legislative development of the regulatory process, Congress has steered the institutional development of its own bureaucracies, such as the GAO, in such a way as to heighten the informational value of the regulatory process. Empirical research suggests the value of the process in generating information about politics and policy, functioning as a signal to policy makers, and enhancing congressional prominence in steering the course of regulatory policy.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Table 3.1 shows the major pieces of legislation affecting how bureaucracies make public policy. Taken together, these laws mold the regulatory process as legislative in nature, address oversight by Congress, and facilitate the creation of information in the process. The regulatory process was built to mirror or mimic similar processes in Congress for the development of legislation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the US GovernmentHow Congress and Federal Agencies Process Information and Solve Problems, pp. 62 - 74Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015