The Dialogical Roots of Deduction Historical, Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning
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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 December 2020
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- The Dialogical Roots of DeductionHistorical, Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning, pp. 238 - 260Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
References
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