8 - Empirical results for decisions to offer concessions in negotiations

Summary

In this chapter we turn to the empirical analysis of decisions by leaders in both challenger and target states to offer concessions in negotiations over disputed territory. Our analysis of the Negotiations Stage in this chapter is designed to build on the initial decision of the challenger to seek talks in the Challenge the Status Quo Stage (Chapter 7). We now attempt to explain the outcomes of these diplomatic initiatives. As a result, in this chapter we take the cases from the Status Quo Stage in which the challenger proposed talks and use statistical analyses to test the ability of our four models to explain whether each state will offer territorial concessions during those rounds of negotiations.

We find that there are two general types of cases of “negotiations.” The first type consists of those instances in which the challenger's initial call for talks leads to subsequent negotiations over a longer period of time. In the second case, however, the challenger's initiative does not lead to formal substantive talks, but the two parties do exchange proposals and discuss the possibility of opening up more extensive talks. Nevertheless, these initial talks quickly become stalemated at this preliminary stage of discussions. It is important to include this latter set of cases since they represent attempts to undertake more extensive negotiations, and the reasons why they do not advance beyond preliminary talks should be addressed by the theoretical models we are testing.