Book contents
- Cyber Operations and International Law
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law: 146
- Cyber Operations and International Law
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- 1 Does International Law Matter in Cyberspace?
- Part I Attribution
- 2 Attribution to a Machine or a Human: A Technical Process
- 3 The Question of Evidence: From Technical to Legal Attribution
- 4 Attribution to a State
- Part I – Conclusion
- Part II The Lawfulness of Cyber Operations
- Part III Remedies against State-Sponsored Cyber Operations
- 11 Conclusion
- Appendix Table Assessing the Lawfulness of Cyber Operations and Potential Responses
- Select Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law
Part I – Conclusion
from Part I - Attribution
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2020
- Cyber Operations and International Law
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law: 146
- Cyber Operations and International Law
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- 1 Does International Law Matter in Cyberspace?
- Part I Attribution
- 2 Attribution to a Machine or a Human: A Technical Process
- 3 The Question of Evidence: From Technical to Legal Attribution
- 4 Attribution to a State
- Part I – Conclusion
- Part II The Lawfulness of Cyber Operations
- Part III Remedies against State-Sponsored Cyber Operations
- 11 Conclusion
- Appendix Table Assessing the Lawfulness of Cyber Operations and Potential Responses
- Select Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law
Summary
This first Part of the book dealt with the attribution of cyber operations and focused mainly on the international law dimension of attribution, namely the identification of the State conducting or sponsoring a cyber operation. This was the object of Chapter 4. The need to contextualise this analysis required examination of the imputation to a State together with the two other dimensions of attribution: identification of the machines and human perpetrators involved in the cyber operations. This was the object of Chapter 2. An important outcome of this study is that even if they are closely related to each other, the various dimensions of attribution remain separate and distinct. Even when the identification of the computer is impossible, attribution to the State might nevertheless be possible. Thus, in any exercise establishing the origins of a cyber operation, the impossibility, or difficulty, of performing technical attribution does not prevent attribution to the human perpetrator or the potential sponsoring State. Large amounts of information about relevant factors outside the technical and cyber realms can be gathered and might lead to attribution.
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- Information
- Cyber Operations and International Law , pp. 189 - 190Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020