2 - Hermogenes' conventionalism (384c–386e)

Summary

CONVENTION AND INDIVIDUAL DECISION (384C–385B)

First statement (384ce)

Hermogenes begins to state his own views politely contradicting Cratylus:

he. Well, Socrates, though I have often discussed both with Cratylus here and with many others, I cannot be persuaded that there is any other correctness of a name than convention and agreement [συνθήκη καὶ ὁμολογία]. For it seems to me that, whatever name one imposes on something, this is its correct name [ὅτι ἄν τίς τῳ θῆται ὄνομα, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀρθόν]; and that, if one changes it by imposing another one again, and does not call the thing by the former name any more [καὶ ἂν αὖθίς γε ἕτερον μεταθῆται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μηκέτι καλῇ], the new name is no less correct than the old, as when we change the name of our slaves. For no name belongs by nature to anything [οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκέναι ὄνομα οὐδὲν οὐδενί], but in virtue of the custom and habit of those who made names into habits and those who call things by them [ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων].

(384c10–e2)

The core of Hermogenes' self-presentation can be divided into three sentences:

1. (H₁) ‘I cannot … agreement’ (c11–d2),

2. (H₂) ‘It seems to me … our slaves’ (d2–5),

3. (H₃) ‘No name … call things’ (d5–7).

Let us examine each sentence more closely.

(H1) asserts that the correctness of the name consists in convention (συνθήκη) and agreement (ὁμολογία).