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5 - Political Knowledge and the Logic of Voting: A Comparative Study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2009

By
Marta Fraile
Edited by
José María Maravall  and
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
Marta Fraile
Affiliation:
Doctora Miembro of the Instituto Juan March and Research Fellow, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
José María Maravall
Affiliation:
Juan March Institute, Madrid
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
Affiliation:
Juan March Institute, Madrid
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Summary

Introduction

This chapter examines the decision-making process by which individual voters cast their ballots. In particular, it discusses two traditional explanations of electoral behavior: ideological voting and performance voting. These explanations of voting share a common assumption: electors' decisions are based on what they expect to get from their choice. Each potential outcome has a benefit or a cost, and citizens might choose the one benefiting them most or costing them least. That is, voters will maximize the utility of their electoral decision. To maximize the utility of a given decision, an individual needs to have a certain amount of information at hand.

Previous research has explained the simple and straightforward decision rule at work in both ideological and performance voting. In the case of ideological voting, citizens vote for the party that is perceived to be closer to their ideal position on the left–right dimension. Given the lack of perfect information for the electorate, Downs conceived ideology as an information-saving device – that is, a perceptual cue that helps ordinary citizens gain a general idea about the policy positions of the main parties of their political system. In the case of performance voting, citizens decide on a standard of what they consider good performance and reward the incumbent if this standard has been achieved; otherwise, they punish the incumbent.

Type
Chapter
Information
Controlling Governments
Voters, Institutions, and Accountability
 , pp. 131 - 156
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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