Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-7cvxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T01:54:05.884Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Comparative corporate governance: the state of the art and international regulation

from Part I - General report

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2013

By
Klaus J. Hopt
Edited by
Andreas M. Fleckner  and
Klaus J. Hopt
Andreas M. Fleckner
Affiliation:
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany
Klaus J. Hopt
Affiliation:
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany
Get access

Summary

Abstract

Corporate governance, i.e. the system by which companies are directed and controlled, has become a key topic for legislators, practitioners, and academics in all modern industrial states. The recent financial crisis has highlighted the problems. Yet one goes astray if one does not understand how the unique combination of economic, legal, and social determinants of corporate governance functions in each country. This functional comparative analysis based on reports from thirty-three countries and with references to economic literature deals with the concepts, instruments (including soft law), and sources of corporate governance, and analyzes the regulation and practice of the various actors in corporate governance: mainly the board and the shareholders, but also labor, gatekeepers (in particular the auditors), the supervisors, and the courts. In the end, a great deal of convergence emerges, though many path-dependent differences remain.

Introduction

Corporate governance is a greatly discussed topic, particularly in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. In less than one year, it has led to three Green Papers by the European Commission; and in individual European countries and elsewhere in the world, it has attracted increased attention from legislators, courts, corporate governance commissions, members of academia, and the general public alike. Corporate governance as a concept and as a problem area was first discussed in the US; later, the European debate started in the UK. From there the issue of corporate governance began its pervasive course through all the modern industrial states, including Australia, China, and Japan. Contributions and research projects on the topic abound all over the world.

Type
Chapter
Information
Comparative Corporate Governance
A Functional and International Analysis
 , pp. 3 - 102
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Hopt, K., “Corporate Governance,” in Brown, K. and Snyder, D. (eds.), General Reports of the XVIIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law/Rapports Généraux du XVIIIème Congrès de l'Adadémie Internationale de Droit Comparé (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer, 2012), pp. 295–320Google Scholar
European Company Law Experts, “Response,”Rivista delle Società 56 (2011), 1222Google Scholar
Bachmann, G., “Der ‘Europäische Corporate Governance-Rahmen,’”WM (2011), 1301Google Scholar
Emmenegger, S. (ed.), Corporate Governance (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011)
Hopt, K., Kanda, H., Roe, M., Wymeersch, E., and Prigge, S. (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), pp. 1201–1210
Hopt, K., Wymeersch, E., Kanda, H., and Baum, H. (eds.), Corporate Governance in Context – Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and the US (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 731–742
Hommelhoff, P., Hopt, K., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart/Cologne: Schäffer-Poeschel/Schmidt, 2009), pp. 931–952 (organized into ten topics by Patrick C. Leyens)
Becht, M., Bolton, P., and Röell, A., “Ch. 12, Corporate Law and Governance,” in Mitchell Polinsky, A. and Shavell, S. (eds.), Handbook of Law and Economics, vol. II (Amsterdam/Oxford: Elsevier North-Holland, 2007), p. 833Google Scholar
Bühler, C., Regulierung im Bereich der Corporate Governance (Zürich/St. Gallen: Dike, 2009)Google Scholar
Mallin, C. (ed.), Handbook on International Corporate Governance, Country Analyses, 2nd edn. (Cheltenham/Northampton: Elgar, 2011)CrossRef
Clarke, Thomas (ed.), Corporate Governance, Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, 5 vols. (New York: Routledge, 2005)
Adams, R., Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M., “The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey,”Journal of Economic Literature 48(1) (2010), 58–107CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bebchuk, L. and Weisbach, M., “The State of Corporate Governance Research,”Review of Financial Studies 23(3) (2010), 939–961CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aguilera, R. and Jackson, G., “Comparative and International Corporate Governance,”The Academy of Management Annals 4(1) (2010), 485–556CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 3rd edn. (London: Strahan/Cadell, 1784), Book 5, chapter 1.3.1.2.Google Scholar
Hill, J., “Corporate Scandals Across the Globe: Regulating the Role of the Director,” in Ferrarini, G., Hopt, K., Winter, J., and Wymeersch, E. (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 225Google Scholar
Hill, J., “Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals,”Wisconsin International Law Journal 23 (2005), 367Google Scholar
Enriques, L. and Volpin, P., “Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe,”Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (2007), 117CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bebchuk, L. and Hamdani, A., “The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1263 (2009), 157Google Scholar
Frentrop, P., A History of Corporate Governance 1602–2002 (Brussels/Paris/Amsterdam/Milan/Frankfurt/Luxembourg: Deminor, 2002/2003)Google Scholar
Morck, R., A History of Corporate Governance Around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2005)CrossRef
Wright, R., Barber, W., Crafton, M., and Jain, A. (eds.), History of Corporate Governance: The Importance of Stakeholder Activism, 6 vols. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2004).
Coffee, J., Gatekeepers: The Role of the Professions in Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 2006)Google Scholar
Armour, J. and McCahery, J. (eds.), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart, 2006)
Carrara, C., “The Parmalat Case,”Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 70 (2006), 538CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCahery, J. and Vermeulen, E., “Corporate Governance Crises and Related Party Transactions: A Post-Parmalat Agenda,” in Hopt, K., Wymeersch, E., Kanda, H., and Baum, H. (eds.), Corporate Governance in Context – Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and the US (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 215Google Scholar
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K., This Time is Different, Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton University Press, 2009)Google Scholar
de Larosière, J., The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (“Larosière Report”) (Brussels: February 25, 2009), pp. 33 et seq. n. 110 et seq.Google Scholar
Walker, D., A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities, Final Recommendations (“Walker Review”) (London: November 26, 2009)Google Scholar
Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), Effective Corporate Governance (Significant Influence Controlled Functions and the Walker Review) (London: January 2010)Google Scholar
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The Basel Committee's Response to the Financial Crisis: Report to the G20 (October 4, 2010)
Sinn, H.-W., Casino Capitalism: How the Financial Crisis Came About and What Needs to be Done Now (Oxford University Press, 2010)Google Scholar
Hellwig, M., Höfling, W., and Zimmer, D., “Finanzmarktregulierung – Welche Regelungen empfehlen sich für den deutschen und europäischen Finanzsektor?” in Gutachten E-G zum 68. Deutschen Juristentag, Berlin 2010, vol. I (Munich: Beck, 2010)Google Scholar
Avgouleas, E., “The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 9 (2009), 23–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Becht, M., “The Governance of Financial Institutions in Crisis,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 1615Google Scholar
MacNeil, I., “The Trajectory of Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis,”EBOR 11 (2010), 483, 518 et seq.Google Scholar
Beltratti, A. and Stulz, R., “Why Did Some Banks Perform Better during the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation,” available at ;
Bhagat, S. and Bolton, B., “Corporate Governance and Firm Performance,”Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008), 257CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hopt, K., “American Corporate Governance Indices as Seen from a European Perspective,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra 158 (2009), 27Google Scholar
Lieder, J., “Legal Origins und empirische Rechtsvergleichung – Zur Bedeutung des Rechts für die Entwicklung von Kapitalmärkten und Corporate-Governance-Strukturen,”Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 109 (2010), 216Google Scholar
Williamson, O., “Corporate Governance,”Yale Law Journal 93 (1984), 1197CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tirole, J., “Corporate Governance,”Econometrica 69 (2001), 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kraakman, R., Armour, J., Davies, P., Enriques, L., Hansmann, H., Hertig, G., Hopt, K., Kanda, H., and Rock, E., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 35Google Scholar
Leyens, P., “Corporate Governance: Grundsatzfragen und Forschungsperspektiven,” Juristen-Zeitung (2007), 1061
Allmendinger, C., Dorn, F., Lang, T., Lumpp, S., and Steffek, F. (eds.), Corporate Governance nach der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), p. 3
Cadbury, A., Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: December 1992) (“Cadbury Report”)Google Scholar
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance (1994)
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., “A Survey of Corporate Governance,”Journal of Finance 52 (1997), 737CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clarke, T. (ed.), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance (London: Routledge, 2007)
Windbichler, C., “Zukunft des Gesellschaftsrechts: Orientierungen für die kapitalmarktorientierte Aktiengesellschaft,” in Festschrift 200 Jahre Juristische Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), pp. 1079, 1081 et seq.Google Scholar
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A., “Corporate Ownership Around the World,”Journal of Finance 54 (1999), 471CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Faccio, M. and Lang, L., “The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations,”Journal of Financial Economics 65 (2001), 365CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barca, F. and Becht, M. (eds.), The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford University Press, 2001)
Kraakman, et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, pp. 29 et seq., 305 et seq.
Pacces, A., Featuring Control Power (Rotterdam Institute of Law & Economics, 2008)Google Scholar
Henrekson, M. and Jacobsson, U., “The Swedish Corporate Control Model: Convergence, Persistence or Decline?”Corporate Governance: An International Review 20(2) (2011), 212–227CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berle, A. and Means, G., The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Commerce Clearing House, 1932)/(New Brunswick: Transaction Publ., 1991).Google Scholar
Anderson, R., Durua, A., and Reeb, D., “Founders, Heirs, and Corporate Opacity in the US,”Journal of Financial Economics 92 (2009), 205CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holderness, C., “The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States,”Review of Financial Studies 22 (2009), 1377, 1382–1385CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cheffins, B., Corporate Ownership and Control, British Business Transformed (Oxford University Press, 2008 [as paperback: 2010]).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Macey, J., Corporate Governance (Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 10, 118 et seq.Google Scholar
Hopt, K. and Wymeersch, E. (eds.), Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford University Press, 2003)
Armour, J. and Skeel, D., “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation,”Georgetown Law Journal 95 (2007), 1727Google Scholar
Ferrarini, G. and Miller, G., “A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe,”Cornell International Law Journal 42 (2009), 301Google Scholar
Kozyris, P. (ed.), Corporate Takeovers Through the Public Markets (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996)
European Commission, Report an the Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids, COM(2012) 347 final (June 28, 2012)
Hopt, K., Europäisches Übernahmerecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013)
Milhaupt, C. and Pistor, K., Law & Capitalism (University of Chicago Press, 2008), with case studiesCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001)CrossRef
Bebchuk, L. and Roe, M., “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance,”Stanford Law Review 52 (1999), 127CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mallin, C. (ed.), International Corporate Governance, A Case Study Approach (Cheltenham/Northampton: Elgar, 2006)CrossRef
Köritz, A., Konvergenz und Divergenz der Corporate Governance in Deutschland und Großbritannien (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enriques, L., “Corporate Governance Reforms in Italy: What Has Been Done and What Is Left to Do,”EBOR 10 (2009), 477, 510 et seq.Google Scholar
Bayer, W., “Aktienrecht in Zahlen,”Die Aktiengesellschaft Special Issue 8/2010 (2010)Google Scholar
Bernitz, U. and Ringe, W.-G. (eds.), Company Law and Economic Protectionism – New Challenges for European Integration (Oxford University Press, 2010)CrossRef
Hopt, K., “Obstacles to Corporate Restructuring: Observations from a European and German Perspective,” in Essays in Honour of Wymeersch (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 373Google Scholar
Roe, M., Strong Managers, Weak Owners, The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar
Roe, M., Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 2003)Google Scholar
Bainbridge, S., “The Politics of Corporate Governance,”Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 (1995), 671 on Roe's first bookGoogle Scholar
McCahery, J., Raaijmakers, T., and Vermeulen, E. (eds.), The Governance of Close Corporations and Partnerships (Oxford University Press, 2004)CrossRef
McCahery, J. and Vermeulen, E. (eds.), Corporate Governance of Non-listed Companies (Oxford University Press, 2008 [paperback: 2010])CrossRef
Cadbury, A., Family Firms and their Governance: Creating Tomorrow's Company from Today's (London: Egon Zehnder International, 2000)Google Scholar
Koeberle-Schmid, A., Fahrion, H., and Witt, P., Family Business Governance, 2nd edn. (Wiesbaden: SpringerGabler, 2012)Google Scholar
Whincop, M., Corporate Governance in Government Corporations (London: Ashgate, 2005)Google Scholar
Verret, J., “Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice,”Yale Journal on Regulation 27 (2010), 283Google Scholar
Schürnbrand, J., “Public Corporate Governance Kodex für öffentliche Unternehmen,”ZIP (2010), 1105Google Scholar
Marsch-Barner, R., “Gedanken zum Public Corporate Governance Kodex,” in Festschrift für Schneider (Cologne: Schmidt, 2011), pp. 771–786Google Scholar
Raiser, T., “Grenzen der rechtlichen Zulässigkeit von Public Corporate Governance Kodizes,”ZIP (2011), 353Google Scholar
von Schnurbein, G. and Stöckli, S., “Die Gestaltung von Nonprofit Governance Kodizes in Deutschland und der Schweiz,”DBW 70 (2010), 493–509Google Scholar
Hopt, K. and von Hippel, T. (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (Cambridge University Press, 2010)CrossRef
Bachmann, G., “(Oral) Report: Finanzmarktregulierung – Welche Regelungen empfehlen sich für den deutschen und europäischen Finanzsektor?” in Verhandlungen 68. Deutscher Juristentag, Berlin 2010, vol. II/1 (Munich: Beck, 2010)Google Scholar
Mülbert, P., “Corporate Governance of Banks,”EBOR 10 (2009), 411Google Scholar
Mülbert, P., “Corporate Governance in der Krise,”ZHR 174 (2010), 375Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Corporate Governance von Banken,” in Festschrift für Nobbe (Cologne: RWS-Verl. Kommunikationsforum, 2009), p. 853Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis,” in E. Wymeersch, K. J. Hopt, G. Ferrarini (eds.), Financial Regulation and Supervision (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 337–367Google Scholar
Wohlmannstetter, G., “Corporate Governance von Banken,” in Hommelhoff, P., Hopt, K., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart/Cologne: Schäffer-Poeschel/Schmidt, 2009), p. 905Google Scholar
Emmenegger, S., “Prudentielle Corporate Governance,” in Emmenegger, S. (ed.), Corporate Governance (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011), pp. 1 et seq.Google Scholar
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance (October 2010)
OECD, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages (June 2009)
OECD, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Conclusions and Emerging Good Practices to Enhance Implementation of the Principles (February 24, 2010)
Hopt, K. and Wohlmannstetter, G. (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance von Banken (Munich: Beck, 2011)
Wymeersch, E., Hopt, K., and Ferrarini, G. (eds.), Financial Regulation and Supervision, A Post-Crisis Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2012); E. Ferran, N. Moloney, J. G. Hill, and J. C. Coffee, Jr. (eds.), The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press, 2012).CrossRef
Möslein, F., “Contract Governance und Corporate Governance im Zusammenspiel – Lehren aus der globalen Finanzkrise,”JZ (2010), 72Google Scholar
Möslein, F., “‘Governance by Default’ – Innovation und Koordination durch dispositives Recht,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. II (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 2861Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Comparative Company Law,” in Reimann, M. and Zimmermann, R. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 1161 with further referencesGoogle Scholar
Hopt, K., Der Kapitalanlegerschutz im Recht der Banken (Munich: Beck, 1975), pp. 152 et seq.Google Scholar
New York Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance, Report of the New York Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance (September 23, 2010)
Hart, O. and Moore, J., “The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership,”Oxford Review of Economic Policy 12(4) (1996), 53–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Köndgen, J., “Ownership and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges,”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 154 (1998), 224Google Scholar
Fleckner, A., “Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads,”Fordham Law Review 74 (2006), 2541Google Scholar
Bachmann, G., Private Ordnung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006)Google Scholar
Callies, G.-P. and Zumbansen, P., Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart, 2010)Google Scholar
Hellwig, M., “Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance,” in Hopt, K., Wymeersch, E., Kanda, H., and Baum, H. (eds.), Corporate Governance in Context – Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and the US (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 379Google Scholar
Cadbury, A., Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View (Oxford University Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weil, Gotshal & Manges Study for the European Commission, Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and Its Member States (January 2002)
Ringleb, H.-M., Kremer, T., Lutter, M., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Kommentar zum deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex, 4th edn. (Munich: Beck, 2010)
Ringleb, H.-M., Krämer, T., Lutter, M., and von Werder, A., “Die Kodex-Änderungen vom Mai 2010,”NZG (2012), 1081Google Scholar
Hopt, K. J., “Deutscher Corporate Governance Codex: Grundlagen und Praxisfragen,” in Krieger, G. et al., Festschrift für Hoffmann-Becking (Cologne: Otto Schmidt, 2013) p. 561Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Takeovers, Secrecy and Conflicts of Interest: Problems for Boards and Banks,” in Payne, J. (ed.), Takeovers in English and German Law (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart, 2002), pp. 33–63Google Scholar
von Werder, A. and Talaulicar, T., “Kodexreport 2010: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex,” Der Betrieb (2010), 853
von Werder, A. and Böhme, J., “Corporate Governance Report 2011,” Der Betrieb (2011), 1285
von Werder, A., “Ökonomische Grundlagen der Corporate Governance,” in Hommelhoff, P., Hopt, K., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart/Cologne: Schäffer-Poeschel/Schmidt, 2009), pp. 3, 24 et seq.Google Scholar
Nowak, E., Rott, R., and Mahr, T., “Wer den Kodex nicht einhält, wird bestraft?”ZGR (2005), 252Google Scholar
Larcker, D., Ormazabal, G., and Taylor, D., “The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation,”Journal of Financial Economics 101 (2011), 431CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Prigge, S., “Eine empirische Abschätzung der Aussagekraft von Studien über den Zusammenhang zwischen Corporate Governance und Unternehmenserfolg,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 1153Google Scholar
Goncharov, I., Werner, J., and Zimmermann, J., “Does Compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code Have an Impact on Stock Valuation? An Empirical Analysis,”Corporate Governance: An International Review 14 (2006), 432CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bühler, Regulierung im Bereich der Corporate Govenance, pp. 207 et seq. with references
Mülbert, “Corporate Governance in der Krise,” 375, 384
Pietrancosta, A., “Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes: A Legal Perspective,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 1109Google Scholar
Bachmann, G., “Die Erklärung zur Unternehmensführung (Corporate Governance Statement),” ZIP (2010), 1517
von Werder, A., “Ist Schweigen wirklich Gold? – Corporate Governance-Publizität bei konditionierten Kodexbestimmungen,” in Festschrift für Säcker (Munich: Beck, 2011), p. 527Google Scholar
Couret, A., “The ‘Comply or Explain’ Principle: From a Simple Financial Markets Regulation to a Wide Method of Regulation,”RTDF 4(10) (2010), 4Google Scholar
von Werder, A., Talaulicar, T., and Pissarczyk, A., “Das Kommentierungsverhalten bei Abweichungen vom Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex,”Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010), 62Google Scholar
von Werder, A., “Zur Signalstärke der Entsprechenserklärung,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 1471Google Scholar
von Werder, A., Pissarczyk, A., and Böhme, J., “Größere Kodexskepsis im General Standard?”Die Aktiengesellschaft (2011), 492Google Scholar
Thornton, G., A Changing Landscape: Are You Ready? Evolving with the Code (December 2010), p. 8, available at Google Scholar
Lutter, M., in Ringleb, H.-M., Kremer, T., Lutter, M., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Kommentar zum deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex, 4th edn. (Munich: Beck, 2010), n. 1631 et seq.Google Scholar
Bianchi, M., Ciavarella, A., Novembre, V., and Signoretti, R., “Comply or Explain: Investor Protection through the Italian Corporate Governance Code,”Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 23 (2011), 107CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffmann-Becking, M., “Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex – Anmerkungen zu Zulässigkeit, Inhalt und Verfahren,” in Festschrift für Hüffer (Munich: Beck, 2010), p. 337Google Scholar
Goette, W., “Zu den Rechtsfolgen unrichtiger Entsprechenserklärungen,” in Festschrift für Hüffer (Munich: Beck, 2010), p. 225Google Scholar
Decher, C., “Die gerichtliche Überprüfung der Entlastung durch die Hauptversammlung,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 499Google Scholar
Waclawik, E., “Beschlussmängelfolgen von Fehlern bei der Entsprechenserklärung zum DCGK,”ZIP (2011), 885Google Scholar
Tröger, T., “Aktionärsklägen bei nicht-publizierter Kodexabweichung,”ZHR 175 (2011), 746Google Scholar
Bachmann, G., “Corporate Governance nach der Finanzkrise,”Die Aktiengesellschaft (2011), 181, 191 et seq.Google Scholar
Hoffmann-Becking, M., “Zehn kritische Thesen zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex,”ZIP (2011), 1173, 1177Google Scholar
Peltzer, M., “Der Bericht der Corporate Governance Kommission an die Bundesregierung,”NZG (2011), 281Google Scholar
Bayer, W. and Habersack, M. (eds.), Aktienrecht im Wandel, 2 vols. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007)
Romano, R., “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,”Yale Law Journal 114 (2005), 1521Google Scholar
Hemeling, P., “Grenzen der Aufsicht,”ZHR 174 (2010), 635, 638Google Scholar
Fleischer, H., “‘Von bubble laws’ und ‘quack regulation’ – Zur Kritik kriseninduzierter Reformgesetze im Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht,” in Festschrift für Priester (Cologne: Schmidt, 2007), p. 75Google Scholar
Davies, Paul L., “Enron and Corporate Law Reform in the UK and the European Community,” in Hopt, K., Wymeersch, E., Kanda, H., and Baum, H. (eds.), Corporate Governance in Context – Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and the US (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 163Google Scholar
Conac, P.-H., “L'influence de la loi Sarbanes-Oxley en France,”Revue des Sociétés (2003), 835Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance After Enron,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 3 (2003), 221CrossRefGoogle Scholar
von Hein, J., Die Rezeption US-amerikanischen Gesellschaftsrechts in Deutschland (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008)Google Scholar
Fleischer, H., “Legal Transplants im deutschen Aktienrecht,”NZG (2004), 1129Google Scholar
Hansen, J., Nordic Company Law, 2nd edn. (Copenhagen: DJØF, 2007)Google Scholar
Soltysinski, S., “Sources of Foreign Inspirations in the Draft of the Polish Company Law,” in Baums, T., Hopt, K., and Horn, N. (eds.), Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law (London/ The Hague/ Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 533Google Scholar
Fox, M. and Heller, M. (eds.), Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms (Princeton University Press, 2006)
European Commission, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward (“Company Law Action Plan”) COM(2003) 284 fin. (May 21, 2003)
Geens, K. and Hopt, K. (eds.), The European Company Law Action Plan Revisited, Reassessment of the 2003 Priorities of the European Commission (Leuven University Press, 2010)
Grundmann, S., European Company Law, 2nd edn. (Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland, OR: Intersentia, 2012)Google Scholar
Andenas, M. and Wooldridge, F., European Comparative Company Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cahn, A. and Donald, D., Comparative Company Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dorresteijn, A., Monteiro, T., Teichmann, C., and Werlauff, E., European Corporate Law, 2nd edn. (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009)Google Scholar
Johnston, A., EC Regulation of Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laga, H. and Parrein, F., “Corporate Governance in a European Perspective,” in Geens, K. and Hopt, K. (eds.), The European Company Law Action Plan Revisited (Leuven University Press, 2010), p. 79Google Scholar
Zimmer, D., “Corporate Law Competition in Europe,”Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 22 (2010), 29–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fleischer, H., “Supranationale Gesellschaftsformen in der Europäischen Union,”ZHR 174 (2010), 385, 413 et seq.Google Scholar
Skog, R., “The Takeover Directive – An Endless Saga?” European Business Law Review (2002), 301.
Hertig, G., “Convergence of Substantive Law and Convergence of Enforcement: A Comparison,” in Gordon, J. and Roe, M. (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 328CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hopt, K., “Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?” in McCahery, J., Moerland, P., Raaijmakers, T., and Renneboog, L. (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes, Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 175Google Scholar
Hellgardt, A. and Hoger, A., “Transatlantische Konvergenz der Aktionärsrechte – Systemvergleich und neuere Entwicklungen,”ZGR (2011), 38Google Scholar
Clarke, D., “‘Nothing But Wind’? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance,”American Journal of Comparative Law 59 (2011), 75 criticizes the US discussion as too intra–AmericanCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Doralt, P., “Die Typologie des Aufsichtsrats und die Logik seines Versagens – Ein erster Versuch aus österreichischer Sicht,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. II (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 3059Google Scholar
Linck, J., Netter, J., and Yang, T., “The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors,”Review of Financial Studies 22(8) (2009), 3287CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hopt, K., “The German Two-Tier Board: Experience, Theories, Reforms,” in Hopt, K., Kanda, H., Roe, M., Wymeersch, E., and Prigge, S. (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), pp. 227, 230Google Scholar
Lieder, J., Der Aufsichtsrat im Wandel der Zeit (Jena: JWV, 2006)Google Scholar
Hopt, K. and Leyens, P., “Board Models in Europe,”ECFR (2004), 135Google Scholar
Bachmann, G., “Aufsichtsratsautonomie – Recht und Politik der dualen Unternehmensverfassung,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 337Google Scholar
Gepken-Jager, E., “Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC)/The Dutch East India Company,” in Gepken-Jager, E., van Solinge, G., and Timmerman, L. (eds.), VOC 1602–2002, 400 Years of Company Law (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Professional, 2005), pp. 41, 56 et seq.: Committee of Nine; 21Neth 6 [p. 653].Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Erwartungen an den Verwaltungsrat in Aktiengesellschaften und Banken – Bemerkungen aus deutscher und europäischer Sicht,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht (SZW/RSDA) (2008), 235, 237 et seq.
Cheffins, B., “Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom,” in McCahery, J., Moerland, P., Raaijmakers, T., and Renneborg, L. (eds.), Coporate Governance Regimes, Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 175Google Scholar
Rose, C., “The Composition of Semi-Two-Tier Corporate Boards and Firm Performance,”Corporate Governance: An International Review 13 (2005), 691–701CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jungmann, C., “The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems,” ECFR (2006), 426
Jeanjean, T. and Stolowy, H., “Determinants of Board Members' Financial Expertise – Empirical Evidence from France,”International Journal of Accounting 44(4) (2009), 378–402 with data from FranceCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davies, P., “Board Structure in the UK and Germany: Convergence or Continuing Divergence?”International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 2 (2000), 435, 448 et seq., 455Google Scholar
Cozian, M., Viandier, A., and Deboissy, F., Droit des Sociétés, 23rd edn. (Paris: LexisNexis Litec, 2010), p. 306 n. 646.Google Scholar
Leyens, P., “Aufsichtsrat: Terra incognita des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts?” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. II (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 3135.Google Scholar
Lau Hansen, J., “The New Danish Companies Act of 2009,”EBOR 11 (2010), 87, 89Google Scholar
Werlauff, E., “Board of Directors or Supervisory Board: Legal Aspects of the Choice Between One-Tier and Two-Tier Management in Danish Public Limited Companies after the 2009/2010 Company Reform,”European Company Law 6 (2009), 257Google Scholar
Fischer, S., Monistische Unternehmensverfassung, Ökonomische Analyse und Plädoyer für ein Wahlrecht im deutschen Aktienrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010)Google Scholar
Bayer, W., “Unterschiede im Aktienrecht zwischen börsennotierten und nichtbörsennotierten Gesellschaften,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 373Google Scholar
Bachmann, G., “Optionsmodelle im Privatrecht,” JZ (2008), 11–20
Ghezzi, F. and Malberti, C., “The Two-Tier Model and the One-Tier Model of Corporate Governance in the Italian Reform of Corporate Law,”ECFR (2008), 1, 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, M., “The Evolving Contours of the Board's Risk Management Function in UK Corporate Governance,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 10 (2010), 279–308, 298 and 304CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bebchuk, L., Coates, J., IV, and Subramanian, G., “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy,”Stanford Law Review 54 (2002), 887CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Staples, C., “Board Globalization in the World's Largest TNCs 1993–2005,”Corporate Governance: An International Review 15 (2007), 311–321CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Becker, A., Corporate Governance, Internationalisierung und Erfolg (Lohmar: Josef Eul, 2010)Google Scholar
Reiersen, H. and Sjåfjell, B., “Report from Norway: Gender Equality in the Board Room,”European Company Law 5 (2008), 191Google Scholar
Frost, I. and Linnainmaa, L., “Corporate Governance: Frauen im Aufsichtsrat – Können wir von unseren skandinavischen Nachbarn lernen?”Die Aktiengesellschaft (2007), 601Google Scholar
Mendizábal, L., “La participación de la mujer en los consejos de administración de las sociedades corporativas,”Revista de Derecho Mercantil 278 (2010), 1233Google Scholar
Viesca, H., Las mujeres en la nueva regulación de los consejos de administración de sociedades mercantiles españolas (Cizur Menor: Aranzadi, 2009)Google Scholar
Basdevant, F., “Représentation équilibrée des femmes au conseil d'administration: loi Copé-Zimmermann,”RTDF 1/2/2011 (2011), 100Google Scholar
Le Cannu, P. and Dondero, B., “Les sanctions d'une représentation déséquilibrée des sexes au conseil d'administration,”RTDF 1/2/2011 (2011), 105Google Scholar
Weber-Rey, D. and Handt, F., “Vielfalt/Diversity im Kodex – Selbstverpflichtung, Bemühenspflicht und Transparenz,”NZG (2011), 1Google Scholar
Berlin Center of Corporate Governance, “Roundtable,”Der Betrieb (2010), 2786Google Scholar
Bachmann, G., “Die Umsetzung einer Frauenquote im Aufsichtsrat,”ZIP (2011), 1131Google Scholar
Oehmichen, J., Rapp, M., and Wolff, M., “Einfluss der Aufsichtsratsstrukturen auf die Präsenz von Frauen in Aufsichtsräten,”ZFBF 62 (2010), 503Google Scholar
Adams, R. and Ferreira, D., “Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on Governance and Performance,”Journal of Financial Economics 94 (2009), 291CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, D., Simkins, B., and Simpson, W., “Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value,”Financial Review 38(1) (2003), 33CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farrell, K. and Hersch, P., “Additions to Corporate Boards: The Effect of Gender,”Journal of Corporate Finance 11(1–2) (2005), 85CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coles, J., Daniel, N., and Naveen, L., “Boards: Does One Size Fit All?”Journal of Financial Economics 87(2) (2008), 329CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Higgs, D., Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors, Final Report, (London, 2003)Google Scholar
Gordon, J., “The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,”Stanford Law Review 59 (2007), 1465Google Scholar
Williamson, O., “Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice,”Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 24 (2008), 247CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, M., “Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder,”ZHR 175 (2011), 597Google Scholar
Merkl, G., “Reform der Corporate Governance in den USA,”SZW/RSDA (2011), 28Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht und deutsche Unternehmensverfassung,”ZIP (2005), 461, 468, 473Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Aktienrecht unter amerikanischem Einfluss,” in Festschrift für Canaris (Munich: Beck, 2007), pp. 105, 116 et seq.Google Scholar
Ihrig, H.-C. and Meder, M., “Der Mehrheitsaktionär als abhängiges Aufsichtsratstmitglied?” in Festschrift für Hellwig (Cologne: Schmitt, 2010), p. 163Google Scholar
Lin, L., “The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence,”Northwestern University Law Review 90 (1996), 898Google Scholar
Gillette, A., Noe, T., and Rebello, M., “Board Structures around the World. An Experimental Investigation,”Review of Finance 12(1) (2008), 93CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J., and Ozbas, O., “When are Outside Directors Effective?”Journal of Financial Economics 96 (2010), 195CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., and Stulz, R., “Why do Firms Appoint CEOs as Outside Directors?”Journal of Financial Economics 97 (2010), 12CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nguyen, B. and Meisner Nielsen, K., “The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from Sudden Deaths,”Journal of Financial Economics 98 (2010), 550CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M., and Raposo, C., “Board Structure and Price Informativeness,”Journal of Financial Economics 99 (2011), 523–545CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steffek, F., Gläubigerschutz in der Kapitalgesellschaft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), pp. 591 et seq.Google Scholar
Güner, A., Malmendier, U., and Tate, G., “Financial Expertise of Directors,”Journal of Financial Economics 88(2) (2008), 323CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dittmann, I., Maug, E., and Schneider, C., “Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They Are Worth, and Why They Are (Still) There,”Review of Finance 14 (2010), 35CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Byrd, D. and Mizruchi, M., “Bankers on the Board and the Debt Ratio of Firms,”Journal of Corporate Finance 11(1–2) (2005), 129CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kroszner, R. and Strahan, P., “Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability,”Journal of Financial Economics 62(3) (2001), 415CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edwards, J. and Fischer, K., Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 124 et seq., 196 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansman, H. and Kraakman, R., “The End of History for Corporate Law,” in Gordon, J. and Roe, M. (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 33, 42 et seq., 67CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fisch, J., “Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy,”Journal of Corporate Law 31 (2006), 637, 643Google Scholar
Keay, A., “Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Law: Can it Survive? Should it Survive?”ECFR (2010), 369, 370Google Scholar
Keay, A., “Moving Towards Stakeholderism?”European Business Law Review 22 (2011), 1Google Scholar
Armour, J., Deakin, S., and Konzelmann, S., “Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance,”British Journal of Industrial Relations 41 (2003), 531CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hüffer, U., Aktiengesetz, 10th edn. (Munich: Beck, 2012), section 76 n. 12 with references also as to other viewsGoogle Scholar
Davies, P., Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), pp. 16–25Google Scholar
Keay, A., “Risk, Shareholder Pressure and Short-termism in Financial Institutions: Does Enlightened Shareholder Value Offer a Panacea?”Law and Financial Markets Review (2011), 435CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blair, M. and Stout, L., “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,”Virginia Law Review 85 (1999), 247CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Licht, A., “The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style,”Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 29 (2004), 649Google Scholar
Gelter, M., “Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder–Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light,”NYU Journal of Law & Business 7 (2011), 641Google Scholar
Supreme Court of New South Wales and the Law Society of New South Wales Conference, Company Directors and Corporate Social Responsibility: UK and Australian Perspectives (Sydney: Ross Parsons Centre of Commercial, Corporate and Taxation Law, 2007)Google Scholar
Buchholtz, A., Brown, J., and Shabana, K., “Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility,” in Crane, A., McWilliams, A., Matten, D., Moon, J., and Siegel, D. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 327Google Scholar
Johnston, A., EC Regulation of Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 356 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Schutter, O., “Corporate Social Responsibility European Style,”European Law Journal 14 (2008), 203CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elsas, R. and Krahnen, J., “Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms,” in Krahnen, J. and Schmidt, R. (eds.), The German Financial System (Oxford University Press, 2004), chapter 7, pp. 197 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goergen, M., Manjon Antolin, M., and Renneboog, L., “Recent Developments In German Corporate Governance,”International Review of Law and Economics 28 (2008), 175CrossRefGoogle Scholar
O'Sullivan, M., “The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate Governance,”Review of International Political Economy 10 (2003), 23 for Germany and FranceCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dignam, A. and Galanis, M. (eds.), The Globalization of Corporate Governance (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2009)Google Scholar
Barker, R., Corporate Governance, Competition and Political Parties (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 223 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hellgardt, and Hoger, , “Transatlantische Konvergenz der Aktionärsrechte,” 38, 51 et seq
Demb, A. and Neubauer, F.-F., The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes (Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 44Google ScholarPubMed
Habersack, M., “Die Teilhabe des Aufsichtsrats an der Leitungsaufgabe des Vorstands,” in Festschrift für Hüffer (Munich: Beck, 2010), p. 259Google Scholar
Adams, R. and Ferreira, D., “A Theory of Friendly Boards,”Journal of Finance 62(1) (2007), 217CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hau, H. and Thum, M., “Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence: Private v. Public Banks in Germany,”ECGI Working Paper in Finance 247 (2009)Google Scholar
Goldman, E., So, J., and Rocholl, J., “Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?”Review of Financial Studies 22(6) (2009), 2331CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adams, R., Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M., “The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey,”Journal of Economic Literature 48 (2010), 58CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rieder, M. and Holzmann, D., “Brennpunkte der Aufsichtsratsregulierung in Deutschland und den USA,”Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010), 570, 573 et seq., 574 et seqGoogle Scholar
Kropff, B., “Der unabhängige Finanzexperte in der Gesellschaftsverfassung,” in Festschrift für Schmidt (Cologne: Schmidt, 2009), p. 1023Google Scholar
Maushake, C., Audit Committees (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 2009)Google Scholar
Steller, M., Der Prüfungsausschuss des Aufsichtsrats (Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vetter, E., “Der Prüfungsausschuss in der AG nach dem BilMoG,”ZGR (2010), 751Google Scholar
von Schenck, K., “Der Aufsichtsrat und sein Vorsitzender – Eine Regelungslücke,”Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010), 649Google Scholar
Simons, C. and Hanloser, M., “Vorstandsvorsitzender und Vorstandssprecher,”Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010), 641.Google Scholar
Hopt, K. and Roth, M., Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 4th edn. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005/2006)Google Scholar
Miller, G., “Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England,” Columbia Business Law Review (1998), 51
Moore, M., “The End of ‘Comply or Explain’ in UK Corporate Governance?”Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 60 (2009), 85, 90–91.Google Scholar
Morck, R., “Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance – Independent Directors and Non-Executive Chairs,”Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper 2037 (April 2007)Google Scholar
Nippa, M. and Grigoleit, J., “Ökonomische Konsequenzen der Mitgliedschaft ehemaliger Vorstandsmitglieder im Aufsichtsrat: Eine empirische Analyse,”ZFBF (2011), 578–608.Google Scholar
Krieger, G., “Der Wechsel vom Vorstand in den Aufsichtsrat,” in Festschrift für Hüffer (Munich: Beck, 2010), p. 521.Google Scholar
Fleischer, H., “Zukunftsfragen der Corporate Governance in Deutschland und Europa: Aufsichtsräte, institutionelle Investoren, Proxy Advisers und Whistleblowers,”ZGR (2011), 155, 161 et seq.Google Scholar
Hüffer, U., “Zur Wahl von Beratern des Großaktionärs in den Aufsichtsrat der Gesellschaft,”ZIP (2010), 1979Google Scholar
Przybylowski, M., Aluchna, M., and Zamojska, A., “Role of Independent Supervisory Board Members in Central and Eastern European Countries,”International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 8 (2011), 77–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Page, A., “Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Directors Independence,”University of Illinois Law Review (2009), 237, 288. As to Enron, 32USAI fn. 55 [p. 1056 fn. 54].Google Scholar
Leyens, P., Information des Aufsichtsrats (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), pp. 156 et seqGoogle Scholar
Hoffmann-Becking, M., “Das Recht des Aufsichtrats zur Prüfung durch Sachverständige nach § 111 Abs. 2 Satz 2 AktG,”ZGR (2011), 136Google Scholar
Fanto, J., “Recognizing the ‘Bad Barrel’ in Public Business Firms: Social and Organizational Factors in Misconduct By Senior Decision-Makers,”Buffalo Law Review 57 (2009), 1, 29.Google Scholar
Hopt, K. and Merkt, H., in Baumbach, A. and Hopt, K. (eds.), Handelsgesetzbuch, 35th edn. (Munich: Beck, 2012), section 317 n. 9–10Google Scholar
Widmann, T., Das Risikomanagement als Funktionselement der Corporate Governance der Aktiengesellschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kort, M. and Wohlmannstetter, G., “Risikomanagement nach dem Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz,”ZGR (2010), 440 and 472Google Scholar
Dreher, M., “Die Vorstandsverantwortung im Geflecht von Risikomanagement, Compliance und interner Revision,” in Festschrift für Hüffer (Munich: Beck, 2010), p. 161Google Scholar
Spindler, G., “Von der Früherkennung von Risiken zum umfassenden Risikomanagement,” in Festschrift für Hüffer (Munich: Beck, 2010), p. 985Google Scholar
Weber-Rey, D., “Whistle-blowing zwischen Corporate Governance und Better Regulation,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2006), 406
Barrière, F., “Le whistleblowing (à propos de l'arrêt du 8 déc. 2009 de la Chambre sociale),”Revue des Sociétés (2010), 483Google Scholar
Financial Stability Board (“FSB”), Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision (November 2, 2010)
Hellwig, M., Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector (Wassenaar: Nias, 2008)Google Scholar
Weber-Rey, D., “Ausstrahlungen des Aufsichtsrechts (insbesondere für Banken und Versicherungen) auf das Aktienrecht – oder die Infiltration von Regelungssätzen,”ZGR (2010), 543.Google Scholar
Brown, I., Steen, A., and Foreman, J., “Risk Management in Corporate Governance: A Review and Proposal,”Corporate Governance: An International Review 17 (2009), 546.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowen, W., Inside the Boardroom: Governance by Directors and Trustees (Hoboken: Wiley, 1994).Google Scholar
Seibt, C., “Interessenkonflikte im Aufsichtsrat,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 1363Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Die Haftung von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat – Zugleich ein Beitrag zur corporate governance-Debatte,” in Festschrift für Mestmäcker (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verl.-Ges., 1996), pp. 909, 917, 921 et seq.Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Prävention und Repression von Interessenkonflikten im Aktien-, Bank- und Berufsrecht,” in Festschrift für Doralt (Wien: Manz, 2004), p. 213Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Trusteeship and Conflicts of Interest in Corporate, Banking, and Agency Law: Toward Common Legal Principles for Intermediaries in the Modern Service-Oriented Society,” in G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt, J. Winter, and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, p. 51
Poelzig, D. and Thole, C., “Kollidierende Geschäftsleiterpflichten,”ZGR (2010), 836Google Scholar
Krebs, K., Interessenkonflikte bei Aufsichtsratsmandaten in der Aktiengesellschaft (Cologne/Berlin/Bonn/Munich: Heymann, 2002)Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Company Law Modernization: Transatlantic Perspectives,”Rivista delle società 51 (2006), 906–934Google Scholar
Dreher, M., “Nicht delegierbare Geschäftsleiterpflichten,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 517Google Scholar
Drygala, T., “Die Pflicht des Managements zur Vermeidung existenzgefährdender Risiken,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 541.Google Scholar
Hellgardt, A., “Abdingbarkeit der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Treuepflicht,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 765.Google Scholar
Blasche, S., “Die Anwendung der Business Judgment Rule bei Kollegialentscheidungen und Vorliegen eines Interessenkonflikts bei einem der Vorstandsmitglieder,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010), 692.
Bork, R., “Pflichten der Geschäftsführung in Krise und Sanierung,”ZIP (2011), 101.Google Scholar
Hausmann, Y. and Bechtold-Orth, E., “Changing Remuneration Systems in Europe and the United States – A Legal Analysis of Recent Developments in the Wake of the Financial Crisis,”EBOR 11 (2010), 195.Google Scholar
Bebchuk, L. and Fried, J., Pay Without Performance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004)Google Scholar
Bebchuk, L. and Spamann, H., “Regulating Bankers' Pay,”Georgetown Law Journal 98 (2010), 247Google Scholar
Brown, K., “New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking Director Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance,”New York University Law Review 82 (2007), 1102Google Scholar
Ferrarini, G., Moloney, N., and Ungureanu, M.-C., “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 10 (2010), 73CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Homann, K. and Wolff, B., “Managerbezüge, Eine wirtschaftsethische Perspektive,”ZGR (2010), 959.Google Scholar
Cahn, A., “Vorstandsvergütung als Gegenstand rechtlicher Regelung,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 431Google Scholar
Böckli, P., “Zum neuen Schweizer Vergütungsrecht – Entlöhnung der Unternehmensspitze zwischen Lohndirigismus, Populismus und Aktienrecht,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. II (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 3003Google Scholar
Müller, L., “Regulation of Say on Pay: Engineering Incentives for Executives and Directors,”SZW/RSDA (2011), 167Google Scholar
Ferrarini, G., Moloney, N., and Ungureanu, M.-C, “Understanding Directors' Pay in Europe: A Comparative and Empirical Analysis,” ECGI Law Working Paper 126 (2009)
Sheehan, K., “The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in Australia,”Sydney Law Review 31 (2009), 273Google Scholar
Conyon, M. and Sadler, G., “Shareholder Voting and Directors' Remuneration, Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK,”Corporate Governance: An International Review 18(4) (2010), 296CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fleischer, H. and Bedkowski, D., “‘Say on Pay’ im deutschen Aktienrecht: Das neue Vergütungsvotum der Hauptversammlung nach § 120 Abs. 4 AktG,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2009), 677
Kort, M., “Rechtsfragen der Höhe und Zusammensetzung der Vergütung von Mitgliedern des Aufsichtsrats einer AG,” in Festschrift für Hüffer (Munich: Beck, 2010), p. 483Google Scholar
von Falkenhausen, J. and Kocher, D., “Erste Erfahrungen mit dem Vergütungsvotum der Hauptversammlung,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010), 623
Lieder, J. and Fischer, P., “The Say-on-Pay Movement – Evidence From a Comparative Perspective,”ECFR (2011), 376Google Scholar
Ferrarini, G. and Ungureanu, M., “Executive Pay at Ailing Banks and Beyond: a European Perspective,”Capital Markets Law Journal 5(2) (2010), 197–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Winter, J., “Corporate Governance Going Astray: Executive Remuneration Built to Fail,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 1521Google Scholar
Thüsing, G., “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2009), 517
Bebchuk, L. and Fried, J., “Paying for Long-Term Performance,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review 158 (2010), 1915Google Scholar
Höche, T., “Das Restrukturierungsgesetz,”WM (2011), 49, 55 et seq.Google Scholar
Bachmann, G., Casper, M., Schäfer, C., and Veil, R. (eds.), Steuerungsfunktion des Haftungsrechts im Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007)CrossRef
Fleischer, H., “Aktuelle Entwicklungen der Managerhaftung,”NJW (2009), 2337, 2010, 1504Google Scholar
Spindler, G., “Sonderprüfung und Pflichten eines Bankvorstands in der Finanzmarktkrise,”NZG (2010), 281Google Scholar
García, R. Arenas, “Suing Directors in International Litigation,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 321Google Scholar
Hopt, K., in Hopt, K. and Wiedemann, H., Aktiengesetz, Großkommentar, 4th edn., vol. III (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999/2008), section 93 n. 49 et seq.Google Scholar
Thomas, S., Die Haftungsfreistellung von Organmitgliedern (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010)Google Scholar
Kerst, A., “Haftungsmanagement durch die D&O-Versicherung,”WM (2010), 594Google Scholar
Seibt, C. and Schwarz, S., “Aktienrechtsuntreue,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010), 301
Hopt, K. and Voigt, H.-C. (eds.), Prospekt- und Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung – Recht und Reform in der Europäischen Union, der Schweiz und den USA (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005)
Davies, P., Davies Review of Issuer Liability, Final Report (June 2007)
Davies, P., “Liability for Misstatements to the Market: Some Reflections,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 9 (2009), 295CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meckel, V., “Die Corporate Governance im neuen japanischen Gesellschaftsrecht,”ZJapanR/Journal of Japanese Law 29 (2010), 53, 75 et seq.Google Scholar
Roth, M., “Outside Director Liability,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 8 (2008), 337CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ihlas, H., Organhaftung und Haftpflichtversicherung (Wiesbaden: Duncker & Humblot, 1997), p. 322 (more than 500 court decisions, mostly D&O cases)Google Scholar
Ihlas, H., D&O Directors & Officers Liability, 2nd edn. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009) with additional statisticsGoogle Scholar
Gruber, M., Mitterlechner, H., and Wax, T., D&O-Versicherung mit internationalen Bezügen (Munich: Beck, 2012)Google Scholar
Böckli, P., “Die Schweizer Verwaltungsräte zwischen Hammer und Amboss,”Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 106 (2010), 1Google Scholar
Reisberg, A., Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fleischer, H., “Finanzmarktkrise und Überwachungsverantwortung von Verwaltungsmitgliedern im US-amerikanischen Gesellschaftsrecht,”RIW (2010), 337Google Scholar
Fleischer, H., “Verantwortlichkeit von Bankgeschäftsleitern und Finanzmarktkrise,”NJW (2010), 1504Google Scholar
Spindler, G., “Sonderprüfung und Pflichten eines Bankvorstandes in der Finanzmarktkrise,”NZG (2010), 281Google Scholar
Henze, H. (judge in the second senate who rendered the decision), “Prüfungs- und Kontrollaufgaben des Aufsichtsrates in der Aktiengesellschaft,”NJW (1998), 3309Google Scholar
Habersack, M. and Verse, D., “Wrongful Trading – Grundlage einer europäischen Insolvenzverschleppungshaftung?”ZHR 168 (2004), 174, 177 et seq.Google Scholar
Hirt, H., “The Wrongful Trading Remedy in UK Law: Classification, Application and Practical Significance,”ECFR (2004), 71, 85 et seq.Google Scholar
Eidenmüller, H., “Trading in Times of Crisis: Formal Insolvency Proceedings, Workouts and the Incentives for Shareholders/Managers,”EBOR 7 (2006), 239, 249Google Scholar
Steffek, F., Gläubigerschutz in der Kapitalgesellschaft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011)Google Scholar
Schillig, M., “The Transition from Corporate Governance to Bankruptcy Governance – Convergence of German and US Law?”ECFR (2010), 116Google Scholar
Steffek, F., “Wrongful Trading – Grundlagen und Spruchpraxis,” Neue Zeitschrift für das Recht der Insolvenz und Sanierung (2010), 589
Conac, P.-H., Enriques, L., and Gelter, M., “Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy,”ECFR (2007), 491Google Scholar
Emmerich, V. and Habersack, M., Aktien- und GmbH-Konzernrecht, 6th edn. (Munich: Beck, 2010)Google Scholar
Haar, B., Die Personengesellschaft im Konzern (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006)Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Konzernrecht: Die europäische Perspektive,”ZHR (2007), 171, 199Google Scholar
Hopt, K. and Pistor, K., “Company Groups in Transition Economies: A Case for Regulatory Intervention?”EBOR 2 (2001), 1Google Scholar
Farrar, J. and Watson, S., “Self-dealing, Fair Dealing and Related Party Transactions – History, Policy and Reform,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 11 (2011), 495–523CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Windbichler, C., “Corporate Governance internationaler Konzerne unter dem Einfluss kapitalmarktrechtlicher Anforderungen,” in Hommelhoff, P., Hopt, K., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart/Cologne: Schäffer-Poeschel/Schmidt, 2009), p. 825Google Scholar
Baums, T. and Wymeersch, E. (eds.), Shareholder Voting Rights and Practices in Europe and the United States (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999)
Perakis, E. (ed.), Rights of Minority Shareholders, General and National Reports (Brussels: Bruylant, 2004)
Ferrarini, G. and Wymeersch, E. (eds.), Investor Protection in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2006)CrossRef
Moloney, N., How to Protect Investors (Cambridge University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hofmann, C., Der Minderheitsschutz im Gesellschaftsrecht (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010)Google Scholar
Joffe, V., Drake, D., Richardson, G., and Lightman, D., Minority Shareholders, 4th edn. (Oxford University Press, 2011)Google Scholar
Ferran, E., “The Role of the Shareholder in Internal Corporate Governance: Shareholder Information, Communication and Decision-Making,” in Ferrarini, G., Hopt, K., Winter, J., and Wymeersch, E. (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 417Google Scholar
van der Elst, C., “The Influence of Shareholder Rights on Shareholder Behavior,”RTDF (2010), 50 with many facts and tablesGoogle Scholar
van der Elst, C., “Are Shareholder Rights Appealing to Foreign Shareholders?” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 629 as to the relevance for foreign shareholdersGoogle Scholar
Vermeulen, E. and Zetzsche, D., “The Use and Abuse of Investor Suits – An Inquiry into the Dark Side of Shareholder Activism,”ECFR (2010), 1 comparing Germany and the NetherlandsCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paul, C., “Derivative Suits under English and German Corporate Law,”ECFR (2010), 81Google Scholar
Grundmann, S., “The Renaissance of Organized Shareholder Representation in Europe,” in Essays in Honour of Wymeersch (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 183Google Scholar
Pinto, A., “The European Union's Shareholder Voting Rights Directive from an American Perspective: Some Comparisons and Observations,”Fordham International Law Journal 32 (2009), 587.Google Scholar
Bebchuk, L., “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,”Harvard Law Review 118 (2005), 833Google Scholar
Bebchuk, L., “Letting Shareholders Set the Rules,”Harvard Law Review 119 (2006), 1784Google Scholar
Bainbridge, S., “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,”Harvard Law Review 119 (2006), 1735Google Scholar
Bainbridge, S., The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ventoruzzo, M., “Empowering Shareholders in Directors' Elections: A Revolution in the Making,”ECFR (2011), 105.Google Scholar
Wymeersch, E., “Shareholder(s) Matter(s),” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 1565.Google Scholar
Perakis, E. (ed.), Rights of Minority Shareholders, General and National Reports (Brussels: Bruylant, 2004).
Burkhart, M. and Lee, S., “One Share – One Vote: the Theory,”Review of Finance 12 (2008), 1–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adams, R. and Ferreira, D., “One Share – One Vote: the Empirical Evidence,”Review of Finance 12 (2008), 51–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hu, H. and Black, B., “Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review 156 (2008), 625Google Scholar
Seibt, C., “Verbandsouveränität und Abspaltungsverbot im Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht – Revisited: Hidden Ownership, Empty Voting und andere Kleinigkeiten,”ZGR (2010), 795.Google Scholar
Böcking, H.-J. and Gros, M., “Internationalisierung der Rechnungslegung und Corporate Governance,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 413.Google Scholar
Grundmann, S., Kerber, W., and Weatherhill, S. (eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001)CrossRef
Werner, K., Ein Publizitätskonzept (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010)Google Scholar
Mölles, T. and Kernchen, E., “Information Overload am Kapitalmarkt,”ZGR (2011), 1Google Scholar
Windbichler, C., “Sunlight for a Healthy Body Corporate,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. I (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 1505Google Scholar
Leuz, C., Different Approaches to Corporate Reporting Regulation: How Jurisdictions Differ and Why, available at .
Fleischer, H., “Die Fairness Opinion bei M&A-Transaktionen zwischen Markt und Recht,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. II (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 2753.Google Scholar
Fleischer, H., “Konsultative Hauptversammlungsbeschlüsse im Aktienrecht,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010), 681.
Gordon, J., “Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy,”Vanderbilt Law Review 61 (2008), 475.Google Scholar
Grant, J., Kirchmaiera, T., and Kirshnera, J., “Financial Tunnelling and the Mandatory Bid Rule,”EBOR 10 (2009), 233.Google Scholar
Roth, G., Das Treuhandmodell des Investmentrechts, Eine Alternative zur Aktiengesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1972)Google Scholar
Listokin, Y., “If You Give Shareholders Power, Do They Use It? An Empirical Analysis,”JITE 166 (2010), 38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simon, S. and Zetzsche, D., “Das Vollmachtsstimmrecht von Banken und geschäftsmäßigen Vertretern (§ 135 AktG nF) im Spannungsfeld von Corporate Governance, Präsenzsicherung und prozeduraler Effizienz,”ZGR (2010), 918, 926 et seq.Google Scholar
Dubs, D., “Die institutionelle Stimmrechtsvertretung in der Aktienrechtsrevision,” in Watter, R. (ed.), Die “grosse” Schweizer Aktienrechtsrevision (Zurich: Dike, 2010), p. 169.Google Scholar
Clarke, D., “Corporate Governance in China: Dilemmas of Reform and the Institutional Environment” (unpublished manuscript) (2006), p. 73.
Baums, T., Buxbaum, R., and Hopt, K. (eds.), Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Winkler, S., Die Veranwortung institutioneller Anleger als Aktionäre von Publikumsgesellschaften in Deutschland und den USA (Jena: JWV, 2008)Google Scholar
Armour, J., “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment,” in Rationality in Company Law: Essays in Honour of D. D. Prentice (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart, 2009), pp. 108 et seq., 110 et seq.Google Scholar
Prentice, D., “The United Kingdom,” in Bruno, S. and Ruggiero, E. (ed.), Public Companies and the Role of Shareholders (Alphen aan den Rijn/London: Kluwer Law International, 2011), pp. 197, 206 et seq.Google Scholar
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., and Matos, P., “Does Governance Travel Around the World? Evidence from Institutional Investors,”Journal of Financial Economics 100 (2011), 154, 157 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Black, B., “Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,”UCLA Law Review 39 (1992), 811Google Scholar
Thomas, R., “The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation,”Vanderbilt Law Review 61 (2008), 299Google Scholar
Schmidt, R. and Spindler, G., Finanzinvestoren aus ökonomischer und juristische Sicht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Myners, P., Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review (“Myners' Report”), (2001)
Institutional Shareholders' Committee (“ISC”), Principles on the Responsibility of Institutional Shareholders and Agents (2007)
Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code (July 2010)
Cheffins, B., “The Stewardship Code's Achilles Heel,”Modern Law Review 73 (2010), 1004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roach, L., “The UK Stewardship Code,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 11 (2011), 463CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fleischer, H. and Strothotte, C., “Ein Stewardship Code für institutionelle Investoren: Wohlverhaltensregeln und Offenlegung der Abstimmungspolitik als Vorbild für Deutschland und Europa?” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2011), 221.
Fleischer, , “Zur Rolle und Regulierung von Stimmrechtsberatern (proxy advisors) im deutschen Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2012), 2.
Armour, J. and Cheffins, B., “The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds,” ECGI Law Working Paper 136/2009 (2009)
Ferran, E., “After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the EU,”EBOR 12 (2011), 379Google Scholar
Kahan, M. and Rock, E., “Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review 155 (2007), 1021Google Scholar
Black, B. and Hu, H., “Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership,”Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (2007), 343Google Scholar
Briggs, T., “Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis,”Iowa Journal Corporation Law 32 (2007), 681Google Scholar
Taisch, F. and Friedrich, A., “Hedge Fund Regulation – Quo Vadis?”SZW/RSDA (2011), 149.Google Scholar
Kumpan, C., “Börsenmacht Hedge-Fonds,”ZHR 170 (2006), 39Google Scholar
Schmolke, K., “Institutionelle Anleger und Corporate Governance – Traditionelle institutionelle Investoren vs. Hedgefonds,”ZGR (2007), 701Google Scholar
Leible, S. and Lehmann, M. (eds.), Hedgefonds und Private Equity – Fluch oder Segen? (Jena: JWV, 2009).
van Eechoud, W., Hamersma, W., Sieling, A., and Young, D., “Future Regulation of Hedge Funds – A Systemic Risk Perspective,”Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 19 (2010), 269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Engert, A., “Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation,”EBOR 11 (2010), 329.Google Scholar
Faber, J., “Institutionelle Investoren (einschließlich Hedgefonds und Private Equity),” in Hommelhoff, P., Hopt, K., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart/Cologne: Schäffer-Poeschel/Schmidt, 2009), pp. 218, 228 et seq.Google Scholar
Romano, R., “Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance,” in Gordon, J. and Roe, M. (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 507Google Scholar
Romano, R., “Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance,”Yale Journal on Regulation 18 (2001), 174Google Scholar
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Thomas, F., and Partnoy, R., “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,”Journal of Finance 63 (2006), 1729, 1755.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Becht, M., Franks, J., Mayer, C., and Rossi, S., “Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund,”Review of Asset Pricing Studies 23(3) (2010), 3093Google Scholar
Bebchuk, L. and Weisbach, M., “The State of Corporate Governance Research,”Review of Financial Studies 23(3) (2010), 939–961.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greenwood, R. and Schor, M., “Investor Activism and Takeovers,”Journal of Financial Economics 92 (2009), 362.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pensions Investment Research Consultants Ltd (“PIRC”), UK Shareholder Voting Guidelines, 15th edn. (March 24, 2011)
Roth, M., “Employee Participation, Corporate Governance and the Firm: A Transatlantic View Focused on Occupational Pensions and Co-Determination,”EBOR 11 (2010), 51Google Scholar
Windbichler, C., “Cheers and Boos for Employee Involvement: Co-Determination as Corporate Governance Conundrum,”EBOR 6 (2005), 50Google Scholar
Pistor, K., “Codetermination in Germany: A Socio-Political Model with Governance Externalities,” in Blair, M. and Roe, M. (eds.), Employees and Corporate Governance (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 163.Google Scholar
Bayer, W. and Hoffmann, T., “Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010)
Calvo, J., Fulton, L., Vigneau, C., Belopavlovič, N., and Rodríguez Contreras, R., Employee Representatives in an Enlarged Europe, 2 vols. (for the European Commission) (2008)
Baums, T. and Ulmer, P. (eds.), Unternehmens-Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer im Recht der EU-Mitgliedstaaten (Heidelberg: Verl. Recht und Wirtschaft, 2004).
Pistor, K., “Corporate Governance durch Mitbestimmung und Arbeitsmärkte,” in Hommelhoff, P., Hopt, K., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart/Cologne: Schäffer-Poeschel/Schmidt, 2009), p. 231Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe,”International Review of Law and Economics 14 (1994), 203CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hopt, K., “New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards,”Michigan Law Review 82 (1984), 1338.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansmann, H., The Ownership of Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1996).Google Scholar
Henssler, M., “Erfahrungen und Reformbedarf bei der SE – Mitbestimmungsrechtliche Reformvorschläge,”ZHR 173 (2009), 222, based on interviews.Google Scholar
Hemeling, P. (chief legal officer of Allianz SE), “Die Corporate Governance der Societas Europaea (SE),” in Hommelhoff, P., Hopt, K., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart/Cologne: Schäffer-Poeschel/Schmidt, 2009), p. 769Google Scholar
Seibt, C., “Größe und Zusammensetzung des Aufsichtsrats in der SE,”ZIP (2010), 1057.Google Scholar
Raabe, N., Die Mitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat (Berlin: Otto Schmidt, 2010), pp. 66 et seq.Google Scholar
Fannon, I., Working Within Two Kinds of Capitalism (Oxford: Hart, 2003).Google Scholar
Kraakman, R., “Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy,”Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2 (1986), 53Google Scholar
McVea, H., “Credit Rating Agencies, the Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Global Governance: The EU Strikes Back,”International & Comparative Law Quarterly 59 (2010), 701.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pinto, A., “Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States,”American Journal of Comparative Law 54 (Suppl. 2006), 341.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sufi, A., “The Real Effect of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan Ratings,”Review of Financial Studies 22 (2009), 1659CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haar, B., “Nachhaltige Ratingqualität durch Gewinnabschöpfung? – Zur Regulierung und ihrer Implementierung im Ratingsektor,”ZBB (2009), 177Google Scholar
Coffee, J., “Ratings Reform: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly,” ECGI Law Working Paper 162/2010 (2010)
Haar, B., “Haftung für fehlerhafte Ratings von Lehman-Zertifikaten – Ein neuer Baustein für ein verbessertes Regulierungsdesign im Ratingsektor?”NZG (2010), 1281.Google Scholar
Fisch, J., “Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review 158 (2010), 1961.Google Scholar
Jänig, R., Die aktienrechtliche Sonderprüfung (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verl.-Ges., 2005)Google Scholar
Müller-Michaels, O. and Wingerter, E., “Die Wiederbelebung der Sonderprüfung durch die Finanzkrise: IKB und die Folgen,” Die Aktiengesellschaft (2010), 903.
McCahery, J. and Vermeulen, E., “Role of Corporate Governance Reform and Enforcement in the Netherlands,” in Essays in Honour of Wymeersch (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 322, 337 et seq.Google Scholar
O'Connor, S., “Strengthening Auditor Independence: Reestablishing Audits as Control and Premium Signaling Mechanisms,”Washington Law Review 81 (2006), 525Google Scholar
Leyens, P., “Intermediary Independence: Auditors, Financial Analysts and Rating Agencies,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 11 (2011), 33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Doralt, P., “Die Abhängigkeit des Abschlussprüfers, Gedanken zur externen Rotation,” in Festschrift für Brogyányi (Vienna: Linde, 2008), p. 410.Google Scholar
Doralt, W., Hellgardt, A., Hopt, K., Leyens, P., Roth, M., and Zimmermann, R., “Auditors' Liability and its Impact on the European Financial Markets,”Cambridge Law Journal 67(1) (March 2008), 62CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Flores, C., “New Trends in Auditor Liability,”EBOR 112 (2011), 415.Google Scholar
Macey, J., “The Distorting Incentives Facing the US Securities and Exchange Commission,”Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 33/2 (2010), 639.Google Scholar
Coffee, J., “Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review 156 (2007), 229Google Scholar
Jackson, H. and Roe, M., “Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence,”Journal of Financial Economics 93 (2009), 207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferran, E., “Principles-Based, Risk-Based Regulation and Effective Enforcement,” in Essays in Honour of Wymeersch (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 427Google Scholar
Armour, J., “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment,” in Pacces, A. (ed.), The Law and Economics of Corporate Governance (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2010), p. 213Google Scholar
Fischer, J., and Black, J., “Law and Regulation for Global Financial Markets: Enforcing the New Regime – Incentive or Deterrence?” Law and Financial Markets Review (2010), 346.
du Plessis, J., Hargovan, J., and Bagaric, M. (eds.), Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance, 2nd edn. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 79 et seq.
Veil, R., “Aufsicht über die Kapitalmärkte in Europa – Regelungskonzepte und Grundlinien für die Entwicklung aufsichts- und zivilrechtlicher Instrumente,” in Festschrift für Hopt, vol. II (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 2641Google Scholar
Magill, E. and Vermeule, A., “Allocating Power Within Agencies,”Yale Law Journal 120 (2011), 1032.Google Scholar
Schlesinger, N., “Etude sur la politique de sanction de l'Autorité des marchés financiers: la fixation du montant des sanctions pécuniaires par la commission des sanctions,”RTDF 3/2010 (2010), 57Google Scholar
Veil, R., “Wie viel ‘Enforcement’ ist notwendig?”ZHR 175 (2011), 83Google Scholar
Hellwig, H.-J., “Die Finanzkrise – Fragen und Anmerkungen,” in Festschrift für Maier-Reimer (Munich: Beck, 2010), pp. 201, 215Google Scholar
Wymeersch, E., “The Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 6 (2006), 113, 131CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liebmann, B. and Milhaupt, C., “Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market,”Columbia Law Review 108 (2008), 929Google Scholar
Milhaupt, C. and West, M. (eds.), Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan: The Impact of Formal and Informal Rules (Oxford University Press, 2004).CrossRef
Hopt, K., “The German Insider Trading Guidelines – Spring-Gun or Scarecrow?”Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 8 (1986), 381.Google Scholar
Arcot, S., Bruno, V., and Faure-Grimaud, A., “Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply or Explain Approach Working?”International Review of Law and Economics 30 (2010), 193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andres, C. and Theissen, E., “Does the Comply-or-Explain Principle Work?”Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008), 289.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rock, E. and Wachter, M., “Norms and Corporate Law: An Introduction,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149 (2001)Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Self-Regulation in Banking and Finance – Practice and Theory in Germany,” in La Déontologie bancaire et financière/The Ethical Standards in Banking & Finance (Brussels: Bruylant, 1998), pp. 53–82Google Scholar
Buck-Heeb, P. and Dieckmann, A., Selbstregulierung im Privatrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010)Google Scholar
Bachmann, G., Private Ordnung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006)Google Scholar
Hüpkes, E., “Regulation, Self-regulation or Co-regulation?”Journal of Business Law (2009), 427.Google Scholar
Omarova, S., “Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review 159 (2011), 411 for regulated self–regulation in the financial sector.Google Scholar
Kordel, G., “Behavioral Corporate Governance from a Regulatory Perspective: Potentials and Limits of Regulatory Intervention to Impact the Conduct of Corporate Actors,”EBOR 9 (2008), 29.Google Scholar
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C., and Shleifer, A., “Judicial Checks and Balances,”Journal of Political Economy 112 (2004), 445CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coffee, J., “Litigation Governance: Taking Accounting Seriously,”Columbia Law Review 110 (2010), 288.Google Scholar
Armson, E., “Models for Takeover Dispute Resolution: Australia and the UK,”Journal of Corporate Law Studies 5 (2005), 401CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKeon, S. and Farrer, J., “Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Takeovers Panel in the Aftermath of Glencore: A New Chapter Begins?”Company and Securities Law Journal 26 (2008), 517.Google Scholar
Romano, R., The Genius of American Corporate Law (Washington DC: AEI Press, 1993)Google Scholar
Roe, M., “Delaware's Competition,”Harvard Law Review 177 (2004), 588Google Scholar
Buxbaum, R., “Is there a Place for a European Delaware in the Corporate Conflict of Laws?”Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 74 (2010), 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCahery, J. and Vermeulen, E., “Conflict Resolution and the Role of Corporate Law Courts: An Empirical Study,”ECGI Law Working Paper 132 (2009), available at .Google Scholar
Hellwig, H.-J., “The Transatlantic Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue,” in Hommelhoff, P., Hopt, K., and von Werder, A. (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart/Cologne: Schäffer-Poeschel/Schmidt, 2009), p. 363.Google Scholar
Hopt, K., “Comparative Corporate Governance: Ein Themenkatalog, International Congress on Comparative Law, Washington 2010,” in Festschrift für Hüffer (Munich: Beck, 2010), pp. 355, 360 et seq. [pp. 1099 et seq.].Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×