Book contents
- Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement
- Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Churchill, Chamberlain and Historians
- 2 Personalities and Policymaking
- 3 Britain and the Balance of Power
- 4 The Darkening Scene
- 5 The Ethiopian and Rhineland Crises
- 6 Chamberlain Takes Charge
- 7 From the Anschluss to Munich
- 8 From Munich to Prague
- 9 Deterrence by Guarantee
- 10 The Test of War
- 11 Counterfactuals and Conclusions
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - Chamberlain Takes Charge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2022
- Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement
- Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Churchill, Chamberlain and Historians
- 2 Personalities and Policymaking
- 3 Britain and the Balance of Power
- 4 The Darkening Scene
- 5 The Ethiopian and Rhineland Crises
- 6 Chamberlain Takes Charge
- 7 From the Anschluss to Munich
- 8 From Munich to Prague
- 9 Deterrence by Guarantee
- 10 The Test of War
- 11 Counterfactuals and Conclusions
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The challenges facing Chamberlain on becoming prime minister are put in a world context by examining Anglo-American and Anglo-Japanese relations, and contacts between President Roosevelt and Chamberlain. The focus then turns to Europe and Chamberlain’s double policy of appeasement and rearmament. The prime minister’s by-passing of the Foreign Office in his attempts to establish better relations with Italy and Germany, which eventually led to the resignation of the foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, is criticised. However, Churchill was hardly less optimistic than Chamberlain about what diplomacy might achieve. Belief that détente with Germany was possible implied long-term deterrence with expansion of the armed forces restricted to what would not destabilise the economy. A defence review led to a decision that the army should be prepared to fight in support of European allies only after the United Kingdom, its trade routes, and overseas territories and interests had been made secure. This decision, which was in line with Chamberlain’s ideas, has been much criticised by historians, but Churchill also gave priority to air defence and agreed that for the time being the strength of France’s defences meant the army was not a prime factor in Britain’s safety.
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- Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement , pp. 148 - 176Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022