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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2020

Yuen Yuen Ang
Yuen Yuen Ang
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University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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China's Gilded Age
The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption
 , pp. 232 - 248
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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  • References
  • Yuen Yuen Ang, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
  • Book: China's Gilded Age
  • Online publication: 08 May 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108778350.009
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  • Yuen Yuen Ang, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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  • Yuen Yuen Ang, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
  • Book: China's Gilded Age
  • Online publication: 08 May 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108778350.009
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