Chapter 4 - Divine Determinism and the Author of Sin Objection

Summary

Critics of divine determinism sometimes claim that determinists make God the author of sin. This chapter takes up the question of whether this is true. I begin by disambiguating the claim, focusing on reading the charge as equivalent to the claim that God causes sin. I begin by considering a reply to this objection rooted in the claim that evil is a mere privation. According to this particular reply, sin is composed of the positive act of being (which God does cause) and a defect, which is a mere privation. This defect, the reply claims, is not caused by God, nor by an act of a human agent, but instead by a privation. I present three arguments for thinking that this reply is insufficient. I then suggest that divine determinists consider a more robust reply built off of the same analysis of evil and sin, but which claims that privations, lacking all being, cannot be caused at all.