Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Philosophy
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Faith and Rationality
- Part II Religious Traditions
- Part III New Directions
- 13 Trust, Testimony, and Religious Belief
- 14 Religious Disagreement
- 15 Franciscan Knowledge
- 16 Liturgically Infused Practical Understanding
- 17 Knowledge-First Epistemology and Religious Belief
- 18 Epistemic Disjunctivism and Religious Knowledge
- 19 Debunking Arguments and Religious Belief
- References
- Index
14 - Religious Disagreement
from Part III - New Directions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2023
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Philosophy
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Faith and Rationality
- Part II Religious Traditions
- Part III New Directions
- 13 Trust, Testimony, and Religious Belief
- 14 Religious Disagreement
- 15 Franciscan Knowledge
- 16 Liturgically Infused Practical Understanding
- 17 Knowledge-First Epistemology and Religious Belief
- 18 Epistemic Disjunctivism and Religious Knowledge
- 19 Debunking Arguments and Religious Belief
- References
- Index
Summary
Religious disagreement describes the fact that religious and secular beliefs exhibit massive variety and cannot all be perfectly accurate. It yields a problem and an opportunity. The problem is that, especially given the apparent epistemic parity of many who hold other beliefs, you cannot suppose that your beliefs are accurate. This arguably puts pressure on you to weaken or abandon your beliefs. Responses include denying the parity of those who disagree or denying that religious disagreement speaks strongly against your beliefs. This chapter criticizes these responses and defends an alternative epistemology to those employed by both the problem and the responses. The epistemological view defended finds a middle ground between them and positions us to benefit from the opportunity that religious disagreement offers to improve our beliefs. Finally, some objections are addressed: that the opportunity mentality is unnecessary if God supports our beliefs, that it risks our (true) beliefs, and that it is disloyal to God.
Keywords
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- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology , pp. 208 - 223Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023