Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Philosophy
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Faith and Rationality
- Part II Religious Traditions
- Part III New Directions
- 13 Trust, Testimony, and Religious Belief
- 14 Religious Disagreement
- 15 Franciscan Knowledge
- 16 Liturgically Infused Practical Understanding
- 17 Knowledge-First Epistemology and Religious Belief
- 18 Epistemic Disjunctivism and Religious Knowledge
- 19 Debunking Arguments and Religious Belief
- References
- Index
18 - Epistemic Disjunctivism and Religious Knowledge
from Part III - New Directions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2023
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Philosophy
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Faith and Rationality
- Part II Religious Traditions
- Part III New Directions
- 13 Trust, Testimony, and Religious Belief
- 14 Religious Disagreement
- 15 Franciscan Knowledge
- 16 Liturgically Infused Practical Understanding
- 17 Knowledge-First Epistemology and Religious Belief
- 18 Epistemic Disjunctivism and Religious Knowledge
- 19 Debunking Arguments and Religious Belief
- References
- Index
Summary
Epistemological disjunctivism is usually defended in connection with visual perception. The claim is that, in ideal cases, when one knows that p directly through visual-perceptual knowledge, one has rational grounds for believing that p that are both factive and reflectively accessible. This chapter explores the link between epistemological disjunctivism and religious perception. It is argued that, so long as there is indeed a perception of God, there is no clear reason why one should not hold that target religious beliefs likewise enjoy rational grounds that are factive and reflectively accessible. Call this view “religious epistemological disjunctivism.” The view is defended against two objections, and two of its unique advantages are discussed.
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- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology , pp. 273 - 289Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023