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40 - Rethinking Group Dynamics

The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited

from Part IV - Diversifying Perspectives in Political Psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2022

By
Alex Mintz  and
Kasey Barr
Edited by
Danny Osborne  and
Chris G. Sibley
Danny Osborne
Affiliation:
University of Auckland
Chris G. Sibley
Affiliation:
University of Auckland
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Summary

What is the essence of group decision-making? How does group dynamics affect policy outcomes? This chapter contributes to foreign policy analysis and national security decision-making by advancing a comparative group dynamic perspective. Specifically, we examine three models of group decision-making: Groupthink, Polythink, and Con-Div, and apply each model to the Kennedy administration’s decision to impose a naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We claim that applying different group decision-making models to real-world cases presents a new way of explaining governmental decisions. Based on our comparative analysis of the three models, we find that the Con-Div model performs best in explaining the naval blockade decision.

Keywords

Cuban Missile CrisisDecision ScienceGroupthinkPolythinkCon-DivUS Foreign Policy
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology , pp. 656 - 673
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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References

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