Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights
- The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Natural Law and the Origins of Human Rights
- 2 Natural Law and Human Rights
- 3 The Paradox of Shrinking Individuality
- 4 Synderesis, Conscientia, and Human Rights
- 5 The Case against the Marriage of Natural Law and Natural Rights
- 6 The Mythical Connection between Natural Law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- 7 Natural Law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Part II Natural Law Foundations of Human Rights Obligations
- Part III Natural Law and Human Rights within Religious Traditions
- Part IV The Human Person, Political Community, and Rule of Law
- Part V Rival Interpretations and Interpretive Principles
- Part VI Challenges and Future Prospects
- Index
2 - Natural Law and Human Rights
Continuities and Discontinuities
from Part I - Natural Law and the Origins of Human Rights
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2022
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights
- The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Natural Law and the Origins of Human Rights
- 2 Natural Law and Human Rights
- 3 The Paradox of Shrinking Individuality
- 4 Synderesis, Conscientia, and Human Rights
- 5 The Case against the Marriage of Natural Law and Natural Rights
- 6 The Mythical Connection between Natural Law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- 7 Natural Law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Part II Natural Law Foundations of Human Rights Obligations
- Part III Natural Law and Human Rights within Religious Traditions
- Part IV The Human Person, Political Community, and Rule of Law
- Part V Rival Interpretations and Interpretive Principles
- Part VI Challenges and Future Prospects
- Index
Summary
Does the concept of natural rights have roots, logical and historical, in the concept of natural law? Our answer is, ‘it depends’. By this, we mean that some conceptions across Western history do not in fact allow for the derivation of natural rights in the subjective sense. In contrast, others are conceived such that natural rights follow logically therefrom. Our premise is that talking about ‘natural law’ in the singular – at least in the period from Roman times to sixteenth-century – represents a distortion of on-the-ground realities.
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- The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights , pp. 31 - 44Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022