Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Modern Moral Psychology
- Part I Building Blocks
- 2 Moral Character
- 3 Moral Motivation
- 4 Norms: Inference and Interventions
- 5 Moral Dilemmas
- 6 The Moral Domain
- Part II Thinking and Feeling
- Part III Behavior
- Part IV Origins, Development, and Variation
- Part V Applications and Extensions
- Index
- References
3 - Moral Motivation
from Part I - Building Blocks
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 February 2025
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Modern Moral Psychology
- Part I Building Blocks
- 2 Moral Character
- 3 Moral Motivation
- 4 Norms: Inference and Interventions
- 5 Moral Dilemmas
- 6 The Moral Domain
- Part II Thinking and Feeling
- Part III Behavior
- Part IV Origins, Development, and Variation
- Part V Applications and Extensions
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter of the handbook tackles the question of how first-person moral judgments and moral behavior are conceptually linked. The authors frame their discussion in terms of a philosophical puzzle known as “Hume’s Problem.” The puzzle arises from the conjunction of three ideas: Humeanism, the idea that beliefs alone do not suffice to motivate action; internalism, the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating; and cognitivism, the idea that moral judgments are beliefs. These three ideas are jointly inconsistent, so at least one of them must be false. But which one? The authors focus their attention on two possible solutions to the puzzle: the externalist solution, which denies that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating (rescinding internalism); and the noncognitivist solution, which denies that moral judgments are beliefs (rescinding cognitivism). Based on the psychological and neuropsychological evidence bearing on these proposals, however, it appears that neither of these solutions to Hume’s Problem has solid empirical support.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology , pp. 55 - 77Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
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