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2 - Moral Character

from Part I - Building Blocks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 February 2025

By
Geoffrey P. Goodwin  and
Justin F. Landy
Edited by
Bertram Malle  and
Philip Robbins
Bertram Malle
Affiliation:
Brown University, Rhode Island
Philip Robbins
Affiliation:
University of Missouri
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Summary

This chapter of the handbook reviews empirical research on moral character, which has only recently attained a prominent role in psychology, in contrast to long traditions in ethics and education. A person’s moral character comprises their dispositions to think, feel, and act morally, and these dispositions are cross-situationally and temporally fairly consistent. Against a long-standing belief in psychology that the personality disposition of warmth most strongly influences people’s impressions of one another, the evidence suggests that moral character occupies this central position. Moral character exerts its influence on impressions quite independently of other personality traits, and it features prominently in people’s representations of their own personality as well. Moral character is also a central element in a person’s perceived identity – who the person is perceived to be “deep down.” The authors close by charting some of the features from which people infer another’s moral character, including their actions but also, critically, their mental states such as their goals and intentions.

Keywords

moral characterperson perceptionimpression formationpersonalityidentitywarmthintentions
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology , pp. 33 - 54
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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