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9 - Moral Categorization and Mind Perception

from Part II - Thinking and Feeling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 February 2025

By
Philip Robbins
Edited by
Bertram Malle  and
Philip Robbins
Bertram Malle
Affiliation:
Brown University, Rhode Island
Philip Robbins
Affiliation:
University of Missouri
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Summary

This chapter of the handbook discusses the role of mind perception in the categorization of individuals as moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are defined as individuals that can commit morally wrong actions; moral patients are defined as individuals that can be morally wronged. It is generally agreed that the attribution of moral agency and moral patiency is linked to the attribution of mental capacities and traits. The chapter surveys a variety of models of mind perception, some of which focus on the representation of mental capacities, some of which focus on the representation of mental traits. The dominant model of mind perception in moral psychology is the experience-agency model, which divides the space of mindedness into experiential capacities like sentience and self-awareness, and agentic capacities like deliberative reasoning and self-control. Reviewing the empirical literature on moral categorization, the author argues that neither the experience-agency model nor any of the major alternatives to it captures all the factors to which everyday attributions of moral agency and moral patiency are sensitive.

Keywords

moral agencymoral patiencymind perceptionexperienceagencywarmthcompetenceagencycommuniondehumanization
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology , pp. 198 - 221
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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