Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Modern Moral Psychology
- Part I Building Blocks
- Part II Thinking and Feeling
- 7 Moral Decision Making
- 8 Are Moral Judgments Rational?
- 9 Moral Categorization and Mind Perception
- 10 Moral Emotions
- 11 The Benefits and Costs of Empathy in Moral Decision Making
- Part III Behavior
- Part IV Origins, Development, and Variation
- Part V Applications and Extensions
- Index
- References
8 - Are Moral Judgments Rational?
from Part II - Thinking and Feeling
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 February 2025
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Modern Moral Psychology
- Part I Building Blocks
- Part II Thinking and Feeling
- 7 Moral Decision Making
- 8 Are Moral Judgments Rational?
- 9 Moral Categorization and Mind Perception
- 10 Moral Emotions
- 11 The Benefits and Costs of Empathy in Moral Decision Making
- Part III Behavior
- Part IV Origins, Development, and Variation
- Part V Applications and Extensions
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter of the handbook posits utilitarianism as a standard of rational moral judgment. The author does not directly defend utilitarianism as a theory but investigates cases of apparent contradiction between people’s moral decisions (sometimes grounded in nonutilitarian principles) and the consequences of those decisions that they themselves would consider worse for themselves and everybody else. For example, when some people use a moral principle (e.g., bodily autonomy) to assertively make a decision (e.g., to not get vaccinated), it has negative moral consequences for others (e.g., infecting people) and for themselves (risking infection). The author asks whether such contradictions in moral reasoning can provide insights into some of the determinants of such reasoning. These insights, importantly, are valuable even for those who do not adopt utilitarianism as a normative model. From over a dozen candidate moral contradictions, the author concludes that many deviations from utilitarian considerations in moral contexts are reflections of familiar nonmoral cognitive biases, but some arise from adherence to strong moral rules or principles (e.g., protected or sacred values).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology , pp. 172 - 197Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
References
Adelson, J. (1971). The political imagination of the young adolescent. Daedalus, 100, 1013–1050.Google Scholar
Asch, D., Baron, J., Hershey, J. C., Kunreuther, H. C., Meszaros, J., Ritov, I., & Spranca, M. (1994). Omission bias and pertussis vaccination. Medical Decision Making, 14(2), 118–123.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2019). The intuitive greater good: Testing the corrective dual process model of moral cognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 148(10), 1782–1801.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Baron, J. (1992). The effect of normative beliefs on anticipated emotions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(2), 320–330.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Baron, J. (1993). Why teach thinking? – An essay. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 42(3), 191–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, J. (1995). Blind justice: Fairness to groups and the do-no-harm principle. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 8(2), 71–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, J. (2012a). Parochialism as a result of cognitive biases. In Goodman, R., Jinks, D., & Woods, A. K. (Eds.), Understanding social action, promoting human rights (pp. 203–243). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, J. (2012b). The “culture of honor” in citizens’ concepts of their duty as voters. Rationality and Society, 24(1), 37–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, J., & Gürçay, B. (2017). A meta-analysis of response-time tests of the sequential two-systems model of moral judgment. Memory and Cognition, 45(4), 566–575.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Baron, J., Isler, O., & Yilmaz, O. (2023). Actively open-minded thinking and the political effects of its absence. In Ottati, V. & Stern, C. (Eds.), Divided: Open-mindedness and dogmatism in a polarized world (pp. 162–182). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, J., & Jurney, J. (1993). Norms against voting for coerced reform. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(3), 347–355.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, J., & Leshner, S. (2000). How serious are expressions of protected values. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 6(3), 183–194.Google ScholarPubMed
Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (1993). Intuitions about penalties and compensation in the context of tort law. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7, 17–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (1994). Reference points and omission bias. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 59(3), 475–498.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (2009). Protected values and omission bias as deontological judgments. In Bartels, D. M., Bauman, C. W., Skitka, L. J., & Medin, D. L. (Eds.), Moral judgment and decision making, Vol. 50 in B. H. Ross (Series Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (pp. 133–167). Academic Press.Google Scholar
Baron, J., Ritov, I., & Greene, J. D. (2013). The duty to support nationalistic policies. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26(2), 128–138.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bell, D. E., Raiffa, H., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1988). Decision making: Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bhatia, S., Walasek, L., Slovic, P., & Kunreuther, H. (2021). The more who die, the less we care: Evidence from natural language analysis of online news articles and social media posts. Risk Analysis, 41(1), 179–203.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bornstein, G., & Ben-Yossef, M. (1994). Cooperation in intergroup and single-group social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 30(1), 52–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Breyer, S. (1993). Breaking the vicious circle: Toward effective risk regulation. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Buchan, N. R., Brewer, M., Grimalda, G., Wilson, R., Fatas, E., & Foddy, M. (2011). Global social identity and global cooperation. Psychological Science, 22(6), 821–828.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Buchan, N. R., Grimalda, G., Wilson, R., Brewer, M., Fatas, E., & Foddy, M. (2009). Globalization and human cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(11), 4138–4142.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Camerer, C. F. (2000). Prospect theory in the wild: Evidence from the field. In Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (Eds.), Choices, values, and frames (pp. 288–300). Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caplan, B. (2007). The myth of the rational voter: Why democracies choose bad policies. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Carlsmith, K. M., Darley, J. M., & Robinson, P. H. (2002). Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(2), 284–299.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. P. (1969). Illusory correlation as an obstacle to the use of valid psychodiagnostic signs. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 74(3), 271–280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cushman, F. (2008). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition, 108(2), 353–380.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2011). Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations. Cognitive Science, 35(6), 1052–1075.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity, equality, and need: What determines which value will be used as the basis of distributive justice? Journal of Social Issues, 31(3), 137–149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edlin, A., Gelman, A., & Kaplan, N. (2007). Voting as a rational choice: Why and how people vote to improve the well-being of others. Rationality and Society, 19(3), 293–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75(4), 643–699.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foot, P. (1978). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. In Foot, P., Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy (pp. 19–32). University of California Press. (Originally published 1967 in Oxford Review, no. 5)Google Scholar
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & the ABC Research Group (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Greene, J. D. (2008). The secret joke of Kant’s soul. In Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (Ed.), Moral psychology: Vol. 3. The neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain disorders, and development (pp. 36–79). MIT Press.Google Scholar
Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2009). Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. Cognition, 111(3), 364–371.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gürçay, B., & Baron, J. (2017). Challenges for the sequential two-systems model of moral judgment. Thinking and Reasoning, 23(1), 49–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haidt, J., Koller, S. H., & Dias, M. G. (1993). Affect, culture, and morality, or, is it wrong to eat your dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(4), 613–628.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hallpike, C. R. (2004). The evolution of moral understanding. Prometheus Research Group.Google Scholar
Hanselmann, M., & Tanner, C. (2008). Taboos and conflicts in decision making: Sacred values, decision difficulty, and emotions. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(1), 51–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hare, R. M. (1981). Moral thinking: Its levels, method, and point. Oxford University Press (Clarendon Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henle, M. (1962). On the relation between logic and thinking. Psychological Review, 69(4), 366–378.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Harris, R. J., & Joyce, M. A. (1980). What’s fair? It depends on how you phrase the question. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38(1), 165–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huang, K., Bernhard, R. M., Barak-Corren, N., Bazerman, M. H., & Greene, J. D. (2021). Veil-of-ignorance reasoning mitigates self-serving bias in resource allocation during the COVID-19 crisis. Judgment and Decision Making, 16(1), 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Idson, L. C., Chugh, D., Bereby-Meyer, Y., Moran, S., Grosskopf, B., & Bazerman, M. (2004). Overcoming focusing failures in competitive environments. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17(3), 159–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnson, E. J., Hershey, J. C., Meszaros, J., & Kunreuther, H. (1993). Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7, 35–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones, S. K., Frisch, D., Yurok, T. J., & Kim, E. (1998). Choices and opportunities: Another effect of framing on decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 11(3), 211–226.3.0.CO;2-O>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 49–81). Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. (1993). Timid choices and bold forecasts: A cognitive perspective on risk taking. Management Science, 39(1), 17–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D., & Ritov, I. (1994). Determinants of stated willingness to pay for public goods: A study of the headline method. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 9, 5–38.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kohlberg, L. (1963). The development of children’s orientations toward a moral order. I. Sequence in the development of human thought. Vita Humana, 6(1–2), 11–33.Google Scholar
Koop, G. J. (2013). An assessment of the temporal dynamics of moral decisions. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(5), 527–539.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kunreuther, H., & Slovic, P. (1978). Economics, psychology, and protective behavior. American Economic Review, 68(2), 64–69.Google Scholar
Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1993). Focussing in reasoning and decision making. Cognition, 49(1–2), 37–66.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Malle, B. F. (2021). Moral judgments. Annual Review of Psychology, 72, 293–318.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
McCaffery, E. J., & Baron, J. (2004). Framing and taxation: Evaluation of tax policies involving household composition. Journal of Economic Psychology, 25(6), 679–705.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCaffery, E. J., & Baron, J. (2006). Isolation effects and the neglect of indirect effects of fiscal policies. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19(4), 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meehl, P. E. (1954). Clinical versus statistical prediction: A theoretical analysis and a look at the evidence. University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Metz, S. E., Baelen, R. N., & Yu, A. (2020). Actively open-minded thinking in American adolescents. Review of Education, 8(3), 768–799.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Patil, I., Zucchelli, M. M., Kool, W., Campbell, S., Fornasier, F., Calò, M., … Cushman, F. (2021). Reasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 120(2), 443–460.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Polya, G. (1945). How to solve it: A new aspect of mathematical method. Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Read, D., Loewenstein, G., & Rabin, M. (1999). Choice bracketing. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19, 171–197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1990). Reluctance to vaccinate: Omission bias and ambiguity. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 3(4), 263–277.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosas, A., & Aguilar-Pardo, D. (2020). Extreme time-pressure reveals utilitarian intuitions in sacrificial dilemmas. Thinking and Reasoning, 26(4), 534–551.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosas, A., Bermúdez, J. P., & Aguilar-Pardo, D. (2019). Decision conflict drives reaction times and utilitarian responses in sacrificial dilemmas. Judgment and Decision Making, 14(5), 555–564.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ross, W. D. (1930). The right and the good. (Reprinted 2002 by Oxford University Press)Google Scholar
Roth, A. E. (2007). Repugnance as a constraint on markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3), 37–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Royzman, E. B., & Baron, J. (2002). The preference for indirect harm. Social Justice Research, 15(2), 165–184.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sherman, G. D., Vallen, B., Finkelstein, S. R., Connell, P. M., Boland, W. A., & Feemster, K. (2021). When taking action means accepting responsibility: Omission bias predicts parents’ reluctance to vaccinate due to greater anticipated culpability for negative side effects. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 55(4), 1660–1681.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Singer, P. (1982). The expanding circle: Ethics and sociobiology. Farrar, Strauss & Giroux.Google Scholar
Singer, P. (2002). R. M. Hare’s achievements in moral philosophy. Utilitas, 14(3), 309–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 3–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slovic, P. (2007). “If I look at the mass I will never act”: Psychic numbing and genocide. Judgment and Decision Making, 2(2), 79–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Snarey, J., & Samuelson, P. (2008). Moral education in the cognitive developmental tradition: Lawrence Kohlberg’s revolutionary ideas. In Nucci, L. P. & Narvaez, D. (Eds.), Handbook of moral and character education (pp. 53–79). Routledge.Google Scholar
Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991). Omission and commission in judgment and choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27(1), 76–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suedfeld, P. (1985). APA presidential addresses: The relation of integrative complexity to historical, professional, and personal factors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(6), 1643–1651.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suedfeld, P., Guttieri, K., & Tetlock, P. E. (2003). Assessing integrative complexity at a distance: Archival analyses of thinking and decision making. In Post, J. M. (Ed.), The psychological assessment of political leaders: With profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton (pp. 246–270). University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Sunstein, C. R. (2002). Risk and reason: Safety, law, and the environment. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sunstein, C. R. (2005). Moral heuristics (with commentary). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(4), 531–573.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tetlock, P. E. (2003). Thinking the unthinkable: Sacred values and taboo cognitions Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(7), 320–324.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tetlock, P. E., Mellers, B. A., & Scoblic, J. P. (2017). Sacred versus pseudo-sacred values: How people cope with taboo trade-offs. American Economic Review, 107(5), 96–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Tversky, A. (1967). Additivity, utility, and subjective probability. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 4(2), 175–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453–458.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ubel, P. A., & Loewenstein, G. (1996). Distributing scarce livers: The moral reasoning of the general public. Social Science and Medicine, 42(7), 1049–1055.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed