Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Continuity and Change in Investor Protection
- Part I Institutionalization and Investor Protection
- Part II The Scope of Investor Protection Regulation
- Part III The Regulation of Market Professionals
- 10 Techniques of Regulatory Implementation
- 11 Regulation Best Interest, Customer Trust, and the Move to Make Private Investments More Available to Retail Investors
- 12 Best Execution: An Impossible Dream?
- 13 Equilibrium Investor Protection
- 14 Reputational Bonding and the Birth of Investment Adviser Regulation
- Part IV Alternative Regulatory Regimes
- Index
13 - Equilibrium Investor Protection
Active Mutual Fund Fees
from Part III - The Regulation of Market Professionals
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 October 2022
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Continuity and Change in Investor Protection
- Part I Institutionalization and Investor Protection
- Part II The Scope of Investor Protection Regulation
- Part III The Regulation of Market Professionals
- 10 Techniques of Regulatory Implementation
- 11 Regulation Best Interest, Customer Trust, and the Move to Make Private Investments More Available to Retail Investors
- 12 Best Execution: An Impossible Dream?
- 13 Equilibrium Investor Protection
- 14 Reputational Bonding and the Birth of Investment Adviser Regulation
- Part IV Alternative Regulatory Regimes
- Index
Summary
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 charged the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with regulating financial markets as “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”1 Many came to believe this language gave the SEC too little guidance and too much discretion. In 1996, Congress directed the SEC to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether a proposed rule will promote “efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”2 As the SEC interpreted these words beginning in 2012, the Act requires it to incorporate economic analysis into the rulemaking process. Absent a clear statutory mandate to impose a specific rule, the analysis must justify the rule by identifying a market failure as well as the rule’s likely effect on market outcomes.3
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection , pp. 241 - 258Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022