Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Part I The landscape of formal semantics
- Part II Theory of reference and quantification
- Part III Temporal and aspectual ontology and other semantic structures
- Part IV Intensionality and force
- Part V The interfaces
- 21 The syntax–semantics interface
- 22 The semantics–pragmatics interface
- 23 Information structure
- 24 Semantics and cognition
- 25 Semantics and computation
- Bibliography
- Index
21 - The syntax–semantics interface
from Part V - The interfaces
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2016
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Part I The landscape of formal semantics
- Part II Theory of reference and quantification
- Part III Temporal and aspectual ontology and other semantic structures
- Part IV Intensionality and force
- Part V The interfaces
- 21 The syntax–semantics interface
- 22 The semantics–pragmatics interface
- 23 Information structure
- 24 Semantics and cognition
- 25 Semantics and computation
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Introduction
The basis of all considerations of the interface between syntax and semantics is that we can understand novel sentences provided we know the meaning of the words used in the sentence and that we can understand its syntactic structure. This seems rather obvious: We do not understand the text in (1) because we have no idea what some of the words could mean – though it all looks like perfect English syntax. On the other hand, if we reorder the words of an ordinary sentence in an arbitrary way, say alphabetically, we cannot understand a sentence – even if it is one that we might know very well, see (2).
(1) ‘Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
(Jabberwocky, from L. Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass)
(2) a able and at be brotherhood day down dream former former Georgia
have hills I of of of of on one red sit slaves slave-owners sons sons table
that the the to together will
(alphabetically ordered from M. L. King's speech I Have a Dream)
Frege (1892b) is usually credited with the introduction of this insight into themodern logical and semantic discussion, though versions of it have been around for many centuries and in various cultures, as briefly elaborated on in Pagin andWesterstahl (2011). This basic observation is summarized in the form of a Principle of Compositionality as in (3).
(3) The meaning of a complex expression is composed from the meaning of its component parts and the way in which they are combined.
Compositionality certainly describes the easiest case of when we can understand a sentence, but our everyday experience is more flexible by far: Even if we do not know the meaning of the word cruciverbalist, we understand sentence (4) and, in fact, infer themeaning of the word from it.We can also understand varieties of English that use slightly different syntax, even if we are not able to produce well-formed sentences of these varieties. Examples are given in (5) for “Yoda English”, dialects such as Singapore English, or older varieties such as Shakespeare English.
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- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics , pp. 629 - 663Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016