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6 - Well-Being

from Part I - Values

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2025

Richard Bellamy
Affiliation:
University College London
Jeff King
Affiliation:
University College London
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Summary

Good states want to increase the well-being of their citizens, and act to do this. Insofar as state efforts constrain action for the sake of well-being, however, there is a danger that these constraints will limit liberty in a way that actually undercuts the individual achievement of well-being. If we limit liberty in order to bring us to one desirable state (say, good health) that doesn’t necessarily increase well-being if the loss of liberty in itself diminishes well-being. However, when we consider the three major theories of well-being, hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and objective list theories, we see that there is nothing in the loss of liberty that necessarily diminishes well-being at all. It depends on what that loss brings about. Sometimes liberties make us better off, but it depends on the specific liberty and what it contributes. There is nothing about loss of liberty per se that does us any harm.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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References

Recommended Reading

Anderson, E. (1999). What is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109 (2), 287337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  • Well-Being
  • Edited by Richard Bellamy, University College London, Jeff King, University College London
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
  • Online publication: 27 March 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.008
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  • Well-Being
  • Edited by Richard Bellamy, University College London, Jeff King, University College London
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
  • Online publication: 27 March 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.008
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Well-Being
  • Edited by Richard Bellamy, University College London, Jeff King, University College London
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
  • Online publication: 27 March 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.008
Available formats
×