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16 - Opposition

from Part II - Modalities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2025

By
Grégoire Webber
Edited by
Richard Bellamy  and
Jeff King
Richard Bellamy
Affiliation:
University College London
Jeff King
Affiliation:
University College London
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Summary

This chapter explores the idea of opposition. One may make known one’s opposition to specific measures and one may make known one’s opposition to those who hold the office of government. While opposition to those who rule may flourish only in constitutional arrangements that contemplate changes in government, the freedom to make known opposition to measures may obtain and flourish even absent such arrangements. These two different modalities of opposition – to measures and to governments – draw on a reciprocal understanding that those who oppose and those who rule are both committed to the public good. Depending on the design of its system of government, a constitution may enable or empower opposition, with the parliamentary form of government differing in important respects from the presidential. Some constitutional arrangements and proposals award to opposition members in legislatures and elsewhere some degree of authority in exercising the office of government. Whatever the merits of such coalition or consensus arrangements and proposals, they change the function of opposition, for when those who oppose begin to govern, a version of the question quis custodiet ipsos custodes (who guards the guardians) arises: who stands in opposition to the opposition?

Keywords

oppositionloyal oppositiongovernmentlegislaturesParliamentCongressparliamentary governmentpresidential systemconstitutional design
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory , pp. 262 - 278
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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References

Recommended Reading

Applbaum, A. I. (1999). Ethics for Adversaries, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Dahl, R. A., ed. (1966). Political Opposition in Western Democracies, New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Fontana, D. (2009). Government in Opposition. Yale Law Journal, 119 (3), 548–623.Google Scholar
Jennings, I. W. (1969). Parliament. 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Johnson, N. (1997). Opposition in the British Political System. Government and Opposition, 32 (4), 487–510.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, A. (1976). Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1 (1), 11–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kleinig, J. (2014). On Loyalty and Loyalties: The Contours of a Problematic Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laski, H. (1944). The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems. Public Administration Review, 4 (4), 347–359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levinson, D. J. & Pildes, R. H. (2006). Separation of Parties, Not Powers. Harvard Law Review, 119 (8), 2311–2386.Google Scholar
Punnett, R. M. (1973). Front-Bench Opposition: The Role of the Leader of the Opposition, the Shadow Cabinet and Shadow Government in British Politics. London: Heinemann.Google Scholar
UK Parliament, (1940). House of Commons, Hansard.Google Scholar
UK Parliament, (1975). Ministerial and Other Salaries Act.Google Scholar
UK Parliament, (2000). Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act.Google Scholar
Waldron, J. (2016). Political Political Theory, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Webber, G. (2016). Loyal Opposition and the Political Constitution. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 37 (2), 357–382.Google Scholar

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  • Opposition
  • Edited by Richard Bellamy, University College London, Jeff King, University College London
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
  • Online publication: 27 March 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.019
Available formats
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  • Opposition
  • Edited by Richard Bellamy, University College London, Jeff King, University College London
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
  • Online publication: 27 March 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.019
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Opposition
  • Edited by Richard Bellamy, University College London, Jeff King, University College London
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
  • Online publication: 27 March 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.019
Available formats
×