Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- 27 Procedural Justice and Legal Compliance
- 28 Social Norms and Persuasion
- 29 Social Contagion and Goal Framing: The Sustainability of Rule Compliance
- 30 Shaming and Compliance
- 31 Neutralization
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
30 - Shaming and Compliance
from Part IV - Legitimacy and Social Norms
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2021
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- 27 Procedural Justice and Legal Compliance
- 28 Social Norms and Persuasion
- 29 Social Contagion and Goal Framing: The Sustainability of Rule Compliance
- 30 Shaming and Compliance
- 31 Neutralization
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
Summary
Abstract: Naming and shaming offenders is often considered an effective strategy to improve compliance. Shaming exposes an offender to condemnation by a community of stakeholders. The threat of negative publicity, reputational damage and social disapproval is perceived as a sanction, and can in theory be more powerful than a formal legal sanction. This chapter asks to what extent naming and shaming can improve compliance. It takes stock of extant empirical evidence on the effect of shaming policies on regulatory compliance and identifies conditions for shaming to affect compliance. The complex relationship between ‘naming and shaming’ and compliance makes it difficult to predict and control the various effects of shaming sanctions. The chapter concludes that the unpredictability of effects makes ‘naming and shaming’ a risky tool for regulators. A theory about naming and shaming should differentiate among types of offender, shaming agent and social context.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance , pp. 438 - 450Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
References
- 3
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