Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- 2 Compliance as Costs and Benefits
- 3 The Professionalization of Compliance
- 4 From Responsive Regulation to Ecological Compliance: Meta-regulation and the Existential Challenge of Corporate Compliance
- 5 Behavioral Ethics as Compliance
- 6 Constructing the Content and Meaning of Law and Compliance
- 7 Compliance as Operations Management
- 8 Compliance and Contestation
- 9 Compliance as Management
- 10 Compliance as Liability Risk Management
- 11 Criminalized Compliance
- 12 Supply Chain Compliance
- 13 Regulatory Compliance in a Global Perspective: Developing Countries, Emerging Markets and the Role of International Development Institutions
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
10 - Compliance as Liability Risk Management
from Part I - Compliance Concepts and Approaches
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2021
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- 2 Compliance as Costs and Benefits
- 3 The Professionalization of Compliance
- 4 From Responsive Regulation to Ecological Compliance: Meta-regulation and the Existential Challenge of Corporate Compliance
- 5 Behavioral Ethics as Compliance
- 6 Constructing the Content and Meaning of Law and Compliance
- 7 Compliance as Operations Management
- 8 Compliance and Contestation
- 9 Compliance as Management
- 10 Compliance as Liability Risk Management
- 11 Criminalized Compliance
- 12 Supply Chain Compliance
- 13 Regulatory Compliance in a Global Perspective: Developing Countries, Emerging Markets and the Role of International Development Institutions
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
Summary
Abstract: It is natural to think of compliance in terms of liability risk management. In the face of potentially massive liability exposure, it behooves boards of directors and senior executives to take costly steps to reduce these risks for the sake of the firm and its shareholders, akin to other serious enterprise risks. The liability risk management perspective treats compliance as a matter of business judgment rather than a moral or cultural imperative, which has important consequences. The prevailing idea is that firms are expected to invest in precaution (i.e., compliance investments) up to a level where the marginal benefits in terms of diminished liability risk to the firm equal the marginal costs associated with such efforts. This chapter explores from a multidisciplinary perspective the consequences of adopting a liability risk management perspective along three dimensions: the agency cost problem (i.e., whose risk is being managed); the social construct invoked as a result (the problem of cultural legitimacy); and the clash between a company’s own assessment of liability risk and sound public policy.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance , pp. 123 - 132Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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