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18 - Developing Theory of Mind and Counterfactual Reasoning in Children

from Subpart II.2 - Childhood and Adolescence: The Development of Human Thinking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2022

By
Josef Perner ,
Eugenia Kulakova  and
Eva Rafetseder
Edited by
Olivier Houdé  and
Grégoire Borst
Olivier Houdé
Affiliation:
Université de Paris V
Grégoire Borst
Affiliation:
Université de Paris V
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Summary

The first part of this chapter focuses on the development of our theory of mind or folk psychology. The second part gives a brief overview of how counterfactual reasoning develops and how this development interacts with theory of mind development. In both parts our focus is on developmental research that speaks to basic issues: What is the nature of our folk psychology, its genetic or experiential basis, its kinship with executive control and pragmatics, and its cognitive mechanism? Is there an ‘implicit’ theory that even infants master? How does counterfactual reasoning differ from conditional reasoning and why should counterfactual reasoning be important for folk psychology? We examine what answers forty years of research have produced so far.

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The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Development , pp. 408 - 426
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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