Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to the Rule of Law
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to the Rule of Law
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Histories
- Part III Moralities
- 6 The Rule of Law as an Essentially Contested Concept
- 7 The Rule of Law in Montesquieu
- 8 The Spirit of Legality: A. V. Dicey and the Rule of Law
- 9 Michael Oakeshott’s Republican Theory of the Rule of Law
- 10 The Morality of the Rule of Law: Lon L. Fuller
- 11 E.P. Thompson and the Rule of Law: Qualifying the Unqualified Good
- 12 Functions of the Rule of Law
- 13 A Positive Theory of the Rule of Law
- Part IV Pathologies
- Part V Trajectories
- Part VI Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - The Morality of the Rule of Law: Lon L. Fuller
from Part III - Moralities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 August 2021
- The Cambridge Companion to the Rule of Law
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to the Rule of Law
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Histories
- Part III Moralities
- 6 The Rule of Law as an Essentially Contested Concept
- 7 The Rule of Law in Montesquieu
- 8 The Spirit of Legality: A. V. Dicey and the Rule of Law
- 9 Michael Oakeshott’s Republican Theory of the Rule of Law
- 10 The Morality of the Rule of Law: Lon L. Fuller
- 11 E.P. Thompson and the Rule of Law: Qualifying the Unqualified Good
- 12 Functions of the Rule of Law
- 13 A Positive Theory of the Rule of Law
- Part IV Pathologies
- Part V Trajectories
- Part VI Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
For readers of legal philosophy, the title of this entry is likely to generate an expectation of a discussion that runs something like this. In the mid-twentieth century, the idea of the rule of law began to figure prominently and problematically within the long-standing debate between legal positivists and natural lawyers about the connections between law and morality. The question that presented itself for answering was the following. Could the positivist “separability thesis” – the argument that there is no necessary connection between law and morality – be said to hold with respect to the connection (if any) between the concept of “law” and the concept of “the rule of law”?
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- The Cambridge Companion to the Rule of Law , pp. 186 - 201Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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