Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to the First Amendment and Religious Liberty
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to the First Amendment and Religious Liberty
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Notes on Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Philosophical Foundations
- Part II Historical Interpretations
- Part III Law, Politics, and Economics
- 9 Religious and Secular Presuppositions in First Amendment Interpretations
- 10 Two Concepts of Religious Liberty
- 11 The Economic Origins of Religious Liberty
- 12 Corporate Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars
- 13 Which Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause Is the Right One?
- 14 The Two Separations
- 15 The Challenge Ahead
- Index
13 - Which Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause Is the Right One?
from Part III - Law, Politics, and Economics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 December 2019
- The Cambridge Companion to the First Amendment and Religious Liberty
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to the First Amendment and Religious Liberty
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Notes on Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Philosophical Foundations
- Part II Historical Interpretations
- Part III Law, Politics, and Economics
- 9 Religious and Secular Presuppositions in First Amendment Interpretations
- 10 Two Concepts of Religious Liberty
- 11 The Economic Origins of Religious Liberty
- 12 Corporate Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars
- 13 Which Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause Is the Right One?
- 14 The Two Separations
- 15 The Challenge Ahead
- Index
Summary
Debates over the original meaning of the establishment clause have usually revolved around the question of which broad church-state principle is represented by the clause. Strict separationists advocating a “wall of separation” highlight different historical evidence than do non-preferentialists who argue that the clause allows evenhanded government support for religion. A third group asserts that the clause was instead a federalism provision designed to reserve church-state decisions to the states. This chapter assesses these conflicting interpretations and concludes that the framers and the public understood the clause only as banning the establishment of a national church. That understanding did not necessarily represent an anti-establishment principle, however, and it assumed that church-state issues would continue to be resolved by the states. In light of the Supreme Court’s adoption of the incorporation doctrine, the combination of the federalism interpretation and the no-national-religion prohibition best encompasses the original constitutional decision.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020