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Part IV - Main Tenets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 January 2021

Edited by
Torben Spaak  and
Patricia Mindus
Torben Spaak
Affiliation:
Stockholms Universitet
Patricia Mindus
Affiliation:
Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
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The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism , pp. 395 - 558
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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  • Main Tenets
  • Edited by Torben Spaak, Stockholms Universitet, Patricia Mindus, Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
  • Book: The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
  • Online publication: 21 January 2021
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  • Main Tenets
  • Edited by Torben Spaak, Stockholms Universitet, Patricia Mindus, Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
  • Book: The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
  • Online publication: 21 January 2021
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

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  • Main Tenets
  • Edited by Torben Spaak, Stockholms Universitet, Patricia Mindus, Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
  • Book: The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
  • Online publication: 21 January 2021
Available formats
×