Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Fundamentals
- Part II History
- Part III Central Figures
- Part IV Main Tenets
- Part V Normativity and Values
- Part VI Critique
- 27 Gustav Radbruch’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 28 Good Order and Workable Arrangements: Lon Fuller’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 29 Dworkin’s Critique of Hart’s Positivism
- 30 Tracing Finnis’s Criticism of Hart’s Internal Point of View: Instability and the ‘Point’ of Human Action in Law
- 31 Alexy’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 32 Mark Greenberg on Legal Positivism
- 33 Positivism and Totalitarianism
- Index
- References
27 - Gustav Radbruch’s Critique of Legal Positivism
from Part VI - Critique
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 January 2021
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Fundamentals
- Part II History
- Part III Central Figures
- Part IV Main Tenets
- Part V Normativity and Values
- Part VI Critique
- 27 Gustav Radbruch’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 28 Good Order and Workable Arrangements: Lon Fuller’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 29 Dworkin’s Critique of Hart’s Positivism
- 30 Tracing Finnis’s Criticism of Hart’s Internal Point of View: Instability and the ‘Point’ of Human Action in Law
- 31 Alexy’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 32 Mark Greenberg on Legal Positivism
- 33 Positivism and Totalitarianism
- Index
- References
Summary
Borowski argues that Radbruch’s very important criticism against legal positivism is to be found not in his writings on legal positivism but in his own legal philosophy, especially the so-called Radbruch formula; that the Radbruch formula entails a rejection of the separation thesis on both the level of the criteria for the identification of valid legal norms and the level of the nature of law; and that Radbruch’s explicit claim that legal positivism was to blame for the situation in Germany is unconvincing because the Nazis did not, as a matter of fact, hold that law is law and should be applied according to its plain meaning in all circumstances, but were actually willing to apply a statute contrary to its wording if this suited their purposes.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism , pp. 627 - 650Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
References
- 3
- Cited by