Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: Why Common Sense Matters
- Part I
- 1 Attitudes towards Common Sense in Ancient Greek Philosophy
- 2 Common Sense, Science, and Scepticism in the Early Modern World
- 3 The Scottish School of Common-Sense Philosophy
- 4 Husserl, Common Sense, and the Natural Attitude
- 5 Moore and Common Sense
- 6 Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin
- Part II
- References
- Index
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
6 - Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin
from Part I
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 November 2020
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: Why Common Sense Matters
- Part I
- 1 Attitudes towards Common Sense in Ancient Greek Philosophy
- 2 Common Sense, Science, and Scepticism in the Early Modern World
- 3 The Scottish School of Common-Sense Philosophy
- 4 Husserl, Common Sense, and the Natural Attitude
- 5 Moore and Common Sense
- 6 Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin
- Part II
- References
- Index
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
Summary
What role does ordinary-language philosophy play in the defence of common-sense beliefs? J. L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein each give central place to ordinary language in their responses to sceptical challenges to common-sense beliefs. But Austin and Wittgenstein do not always respond to such challenges in the same way, and their working methods are different. This chapter compares Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical positions and shows that they share many metaphilosophical commitments. It then examines Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s respective takes on the problem of other minds and the problem of our knowledge of the external world. Interestingly, we find Wittgenstein employing methods more frequently associated with Austin and vice versa. Moreover, we find that a variety of defences of common-sense beliefs are compatible with ordinary-language philosophy.
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- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy , pp. 134 - 158Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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