Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Brute Rationality
  • Cited by 74
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
September 2009
Print publication year:
2004
Online ISBN:
9780511487088
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088
Subjects:
Philosophy: General Interest, Ethics, Philosophy
Series:
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Information

Book description

This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.

Reviews

"It is a great contribution to contemporary philosophical debate and is likely to make an impact."
Philosophy in Review

"Brute Rationality is a very fine book. It is crisply written, laced with wit, and carefully argued.... I recommend Brute Rationality to anyone who is interested in issues of practical rationality and how they bear upon moral theory."
Ethics

"Brute Rationality is a remarkable book. It is elegant and engaging, and it aims to deliver s traightfoward solutions to problems not addressed by other theories of practical rationality. The theory of normative reasons developed in Brute Rationality is both detailed and novel." - Sergio Tenenbaum, University of Toronto

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

Contents

Contents
References
References
Alston, W. 1991. Perceiving God, Ithaca, Cornell University Press Google Scholar
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1995. “Practical Inference” in Hursthouse et al. 1995, pp. 1–34 Google Scholar
Arthur, J. and Shaw, W.(eds.) 1991. Justice and Economic Distribution, New Jersey, Prentice Hall Google Scholar
Audi, R. 1985. “Rationalization and Rationality” Synthese 65 Google Scholar, 159–84
Audi, R. 1997. Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Baier, K. 1954. “The Point of View of Morality” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 32 Google Scholar, 104–35
Baier, K. 1965. The Moral Point of View, New York, Random House Google Scholar
Baier, K. 1978. “Moral Reasons and Reasons to be Moral” in Goldman and Kim 1978, pp. 231–56 Google Scholar
Balguy, J. 1978. The Foundation of Moral Goodness (1728), facsimile edition, New York, Garland Press Google Scholar
Binkley, R., Bronaugh, R., and Marras, A.(eds.) 1971. Agent, Action, and Reason, Toronto, Toronto University Press Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1995. “The Flight to Reality” in Hursthouse et al. 1995, pp. 35–56 Google Scholar
Brandt, R. 1979. A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Brink, D. 1986. “Externalist Moral Realism” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 Google Scholar, 23–42
Broome, J. 1999. “Normative Requirements” Ratio 12 Google Scholar, 398–419
Cahn, S. and Haber, J.(eds.) 1995. Twentieth Century Ethical Theory, New Jersey, Prentice Hall Google Scholar
Chang, R.(ed.) 1997 Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, Harvard University Press Google Scholar
Clarke, R. 1994. “Doing What One Wants Less: A Reappraisal of the Law of Desire” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 Google Scholar, 1–10
Clarke, S. 1978. Works of Samuel Clarke, vol. 2 (1738), facsimile edition, New York, Garland Press Google Scholar
Cohen, G. A.1996. “Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law” in Korsgaard, 1996a, pp. 167–88 Google Scholar
Cohon, R. 1986. “Are External Reasons Impossible?” Ethics 96 Google Scholar, 545–56
Copp, D. 1995. Morality, Normativity, and Society, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Copp, D. 1997. “Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith's The Moral Problem” Ethics 108 Google Scholar, 33–54
Cullity, G. and Gaut, B.(eds.) 1997. Ethics and Practical Reason, New York, Clarendon Press Google Scholar
Dancy, J. 2000. Practical Reality, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Darwall, S. 1983. Impartial Reason, Ithaca, Cornell University Press Google Scholar
Darwall, S. 1990. “Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals” Noûs 24 Google Scholar, 257–68
Darwall, S. 1992. “Internalism and Agency” in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 6, Ethics, Atascadero, Ridgeview, pp. 155–74 Google Scholar
Darwall, S. 1994. “From Morality to Virtue and Back” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 Google Scholar, 695–701
Darwall, S. 1999. “Ethical Intuitionism and the Motivation Problem” presented at Jornadas Internacionales de Etica y Derecho, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, June 23, 1999 Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1963. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” Journal of Philosophy 60 Google Scholar, 685–99
Davidson, D. 1980. “Freedom to Act” in his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 63–81 Google Scholar
Davies, M.and Humberstone, L. 1980. “Two Notions of Necessity” Philosophical Studies 38 Google Scholar, 1–30
Deigh, J. 1996. “Reason and Motivation” in J. Deigh, The Sources of Moral Agency, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 133–59 Google Scholar
Doris, J. 1998. “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics” Noûs 32 Google Scholar, 504–30
Dreier, J. 1990. “Internalism and Speaker Relativism” Ethics 101 Google Scholar, 6–25
Duggan, T. and Gert, B. 1967. “Voluntary Abilities” American Philosophical Quarterly 4 Google Scholar, 127–35
Duggan, T. and Gert, B. 1979. “Free Will as the Ability to Will” Noûs 13 Google Scholar, 197–217
Edgley, R. 1965. “Practical Reasoning” Mind 74 Google Scholar, 174–91
Foley, R. 1991. “Rationality, Belief and Commitment” Synthese 89 Google Scholar, 365–92
Foley, R. 1992, “The Epistemology of Belief and Degrees of Belief” American Philosophical Quarterly 29 Google Scholar, 111–24
Foot, P. 1978a. “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” in Foot 1978c, pp. 157–73 Google Scholar
Foot, P. 1978b. “Reasons for Action and Desires” in Foot 1978c, pp. 148–56 Google Scholar
Foot, P. 1978c. Virtues and Vices, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Google Scholar
Gert, B. 1998. Morality: Its Nature and Justification, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Gert, J. 2002a. “Expressivism and Language Learning” Ethics 112 Google Scholar, 292–312
Gert, J. 2002b. “Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy” Philosophical Quarterly 52 Google Scholar, 88–95
Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, Harvard University Press Google Scholar
Goldman, A. and Kim, J.(eds.) 1978. Values and Morals, Boston, Reidel Publishing Co Google Scholar
Good, I. J. 1952. “Rational Decisions” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Ser. B. 14 Google Scholar, 107–14
Greenspan, P. 1975. “Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives” Journal of Philosophy 72 Google Scholar, 259–76
Hardin, C. L. 1993. Color for Philosophers, expanded edition, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co Google Scholar
Hare, R. M. 1971. “Wanting: Some Pitfalls” in Binkley et al. 1971, pp. 81–97 Google Scholar
Harman, G. 1982. “Review of A Theory of the Good and the Right by Richard Brandt” Philosophical Studies 42 Google Scholar, 119–39
Heath, J. 1997. “Foundationalism and Practical Reason” Mind 106 Google Scholar, 451–73
Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, Harvard University Press Google Scholar
Hobbes, T. 1994. Leviathan (1651), E. Curley (ed.), Indianapolis, Hackett Google Scholar
Hume, D. 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (eds.), Oxford, Clarendon Press Google Scholar
Hursthouse, R., Lawrence, G., and Quinn, W.(eds.) 1995. Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Isen, A. M.and Levin, H. 1972. “The Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21 Google Scholar, 384–88
Johnson, R. 1999. “Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy” Philosophical Quarterly 49 Google Scholar, 53–71
Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Kane, R. 1996. The Significance of Free Will, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Kant, I. 1988. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), T. K. Abbott (trans.), Amherst NY, Prometheus Books Google Scholar
Korsgaard, C. 1996a. The Sources of Normativity, Onora O'Neill (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Google Scholar
Korsgaard, C. 1996b. “Skepticism about Practical Reason” in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 311–34 Google Scholar
Korsgaard, C. 1997. “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason” in Cullity and Gaut 1997, pp. 215–54 Google Scholar
Lawrence, G. 1995. “The Rationality of Morality” in Hursthouse et al. 1995, pp. 89–147 Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1989. “Dispositional Theories of Value” Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 63 Google Scholar, 113–37
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth, Penguin Google Scholar
McDowell, J. 1995. “Two Sorts of Naturalism” in Hursthouse et al. 1995, pp. 149–79 Google Scholar
Mele, A. 1989. “Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning” Philosophia 19 Google Scholar, 417–36
Mele, A. 1998. “Motivational Strength” Noûs 32 Google Scholar, 23–36
Mele, A. 2000. “Goal-Directed Action: Teleological Explanations, Causal Theories, and Deviance” Philosophical Perspectives 14 Google Scholar, 279–300
Mele, A. 2003. Motivation and Agency, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Mill, J. S. 1979. Utilitarianism (1861), George Sher (ed.), Indianapolis, Hackett Google Scholar
Millikan, R. G. 2000. On Clear and Confused Ideas, New York, Cambridge University Press Google Scholar
Morris, C. W. and Ripstein, A.(eds.) 2001. Practical Rationality and Preference, New York, Cambridge University Press Google Scholar
Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton, Princeton University Press Google Scholar
Nozick, R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality, Princeton, Princeton University Press Google Scholar
Pattit, D. 1986. Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Pattit, D. 1997. “Reasons and Motivation” Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 71 Google Scholar, 99–131
Pattit, D. 2001. “Bombs and Coconuts, or Rational Irrationality” in Morris and Ripstein 2001, pp. 81–97 Google Scholar
Pettit, P. 1991. “Realism and Response-Dependence” Mind 100 Google Scholar, 587–626
Pettit, P.and Smith, M. 1993. “Practical Unreason” Mind 102 Google Scholar, 53–79
Philips, M. 1987. “Weighing Moral Reasons” Mind 96 Google Scholar, 367–75
Quinn, W. 1995. “Putting Rationality in its Place” in Hursthouse et al. 1995, pp. 181–208 Google Scholar
Railton, P. 1986. “Facts and Values” Philosophical Topics 14 Google Scholar, 5–31
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press Google Scholar
Raz, J. 1975. “Permissions and Supererogation” American Philosophical Quarterly 12 Google Scholar, 161–68
Raz, J. 1985–6. “Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 Google Scholar, 117–34
Raz, J. 1999a. Practical Reason and Norms, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Raz, J. 1999b. Engaging Reason, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Rescher, N. 1987. “Rationality and Moral Obligation” Synthese 72 Google Scholar, 29–43
Rescher, N. 1994. “Replies to Commentators” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 Google Scholar, 441–57
Ripstein, A. 2001. “Preference” in Morris and Ripstein 2001, pp. 37–55 Google Scholar
Rosati, C. 1995. “Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good” Ethics 105 Google Scholar, 296–325
Ross, D. 1939. The Foundations of Ethics, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Harvard University Press Google Scholar
Scheffler, S. 1995. The Rejection of Consequentialism, Oxford, Clarendon Press Google Scholar
Sen, A. and Williams, B.(eds.) 1982. Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Google Scholar
Sidgwick, H. 1981. The Methods of Ethics (1907), Indianapolis, Hackett Google Scholar
Singer, M. 1996. “Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law” in Korsgaard 1996, pp. 167–88 Google Scholar
Singer, P. 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 Google Scholar, 229–42
Skorupski, J. 1999. “Irrealist Cognitivism” Ratio 12 Google Scholar, 436–59
Slote, M. 1984. “Morality and Self-Other Asymmetry” Journal of Philosophy 81 Google Scholar, 179–92
Slote, M. 1992. From Morality to Virtue, New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Smart, J. 1991. “Distributive Justice and Utilitarianism” in Arthur and Shaw (eds.) 1991, pp. 106–17 Google Scholar
Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem, Cambridge, Blackwell Google Scholar
Smith, M. 1995. “Internal Reasons” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 Google Scholar, 109–31
Smith, M. 1996. “Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: Reply to Swanton” Analysis 56 Google Scholar, 160–68
Smith, M. 2002. “Bernard Gert's Complex Hybrid Conception of Rationality” in R. Audi and W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, Boston, Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 109–23 Google Scholar
Sobel, D. 2001. “Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action” Ethics 111 Google Scholar, 461–92
Stampe, D. 1987. “The Authority of Desire” Philosophical Review 96 Google Scholar, 335–81
Stocker, M. 1994. “Self-Other Asymmetries and Virtue Theory” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 Google Scholar, 689–94
Strang, C. 1995. “What if Everyone Did That?” in Cahn and Haber 1995, pp. 378–85 Google Scholar
Svavarsdóttir, S. 1999. “Moral Cognitivism and Motivation” Philosophical Review 108 Google Scholar, 161–219
Thalberg, I. 1985. “Questions about Motivational Strength” in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 88–103 Google Scholar
Tilley, J. 1997. “Motivation and Practical Reasons” Erkenntnis 47 Google Scholar, 105–27
Velleman, D. 1996. “The Possibility of Practical Reason” Ethics 106 Google Scholar, 694–726
Weirich, P. 2001. “Risk's Place in Decisions Rules” Synthese 126 Google Scholar, 427–41
Wiggins, D. 1998. Needs, Values, Truth, 3rd edn., New York, Oxford University Press Google Scholar
Williams, B. 1981. “Internal and External Reasons” his in Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–13 Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations, New York, Macmillan Google Scholar

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 963 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 1651 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 15th March 2025. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.