Book contents
- Authoritarian Police in Democracy
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Authoritarian Police in Democracy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Police
- 2 Ordinary Democratic Politics and the Challenge of Police Reform
- Part I Persistence
- Part II Reform
- Introduction: Pathways to Democratic Coercion
- 6 “New Police,” Same as the Old Police
- 7 The Social and Political Drivers of Reform in Buenos Aires Province and Colombia
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series (Continued from page ii)
7 - The Social and Political Drivers of Reform in Buenos Aires Province and Colombia
from Part II - Reform
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 October 2020
- Authoritarian Police in Democracy
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Authoritarian Police in Democracy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Police
- 2 Ordinary Democratic Politics and the Challenge of Police Reform
- Part I Persistence
- Part II Reform
- Introduction: Pathways to Democratic Coercion
- 6 “New Police,” Same as the Old Police
- 7 The Social and Political Drivers of Reform in Buenos Aires Province and Colombia
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series (Continued from page ii)
Summary
Because the cases of Buenos Aires Province and Colombia eventually resulted in ambitious structural police reforms, Chapter 7 presents a detailed sequential analysis of the events that brought about reform in each instance, leveraging changes over time in societal preferences and the strength of the political opposition. The sequential analyses presented in this chapter elucidate the factors that shape politicians’ incentives when choosing between continuity and reform, demonstrating how those incentives changed in response to short-term shifts in societal preferences and political competition. The accounts of Buenos Aires Province and Colombia complement one another well, demonstrating that neither of these conditions is sufficient to bring about reform on its own. In each case, we observe an explicit decision by the executive to maintain the status quo when faced with the convergence of societal preferences (Buenos Aires Province) or a robust political opposition (Colombia) on its own. After both conditions were present, however, the two executives chose to enact comprehensive structural reforms just months after opting for the status quo. By analyzing politicians’ choices before and after the joint occurrence of these conditions, we obtain a greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying institutional persistence and change among police forces.
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- Authoritarian Police in DemocracyContested Security in Latin America, pp. 254 - 304Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020