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2 - Intergovernmental Institutions

from Part I - The Building Blocks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 April 2020

By
Ronald B. Mitchell ,
Arild Underdal ,
Steinar Andresen  and
Carel Dieperink
Edited by
Frank Biermann  and
Rakhyun E. Kim
Frank Biermann
Affiliation:
Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
Rakhyun E. Kim
Affiliation:
Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
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Summary

What have scholars learned over the past decade about the forces that shape the creation, design, and adaptation of intergovernmental institutions in earth system governance and their influence on state behaviour? Context characteristics – shared, science-based knowledge; the behaviours involved; and the availability of alternative behaviours – can shape institutional creation, design and adaptation. The strategies states, existing institutions and non-state actors deploy, in turn, can promote institutional formation despite challenges or inhibit it despite propitious conditions. Context characteristics also can pose larger or smaller obstacles to institutional effectiveness. Institutions prove more effective when their designs reflect political, economic and social constraints as well as major actors’ power and incentives. They shape material, ideational and normative incentives and opportunities that channel states toward positive behaviours and away from negative ones. New research can build on recent findings by investigating complex interactions at and across the international, transnational, domestic and subnational levels of earth system governance.

Keywords

Institutional formationinstitutional effectivenessproblem structurespowerconstructivism
Type
Chapter
Information
Architectures of Earth System Governance
Institutional Complexity and Structural Transformation
 , pp. 37 - 56
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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