Book contents
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Table of Cases
- 1 Health Care Markets and Competition Policy
- 2 Antitrust Policy in the United States
- Part I Monopoly
- Part II Seller Cartels
- 6 Collusion in Health Care Markets
- 7 Collusion in Generic Drug Markets
- 8 The Hatch-Waxman Act, Patent Infringement Suits, and Reverse Payments
- 9 The Alleged Insulin Conspiracy
- 10 Licensing of Health Care Professionals
- Part III Monopsony
- Part IV Buyer Cartels
- Part V Mergers and Acquisitions
- Index
- References
6 - Collusion in Health Care Markets
from Part II - Seller Cartels
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2022
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Table of Cases
- 1 Health Care Markets and Competition Policy
- 2 Antitrust Policy in the United States
- Part I Monopoly
- Part II Seller Cartels
- 6 Collusion in Health Care Markets
- 7 Collusion in Generic Drug Markets
- 8 The Hatch-Waxman Act, Patent Infringement Suits, and Reverse Payments
- 9 The Alleged Insulin Conspiracy
- 10 Licensing of Health Care Professionals
- Part III Monopsony
- Part IV Buyer Cartels
- Part V Mergers and Acquisitions
- Index
- References
Summary
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith observed that “people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” As we will see, Smith’s warning has stood the test of time. Over 240 years later, we find such conspiracies among physicians, hospitals, pharmaceutical manufacturers, medical device producers, and health insurers. Their contrivances to raise prices add billions of dollars to our expenditures on health care. In this chapter, we introduce an economic model of a price-fixing cartel and discuss the deleterious effects on price, quantity, and social welfare. Using health care examples, we discuss collusion among physicians to deny staff privileges, noncompete agreements among hospitals, and market division schemes in the health insurance sector.
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- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets , pp. 117 - 135Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022