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7 - Backtracking on Safety

Risking Another BP Oil Spill

from Part III - America’s Seas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2022

Shanti Gamper-Rabindran
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Summary

The expansion of offshore drilling to deeper waters in the Gulf of Mexico and to more remote waters in the Arctic, as well as more intense hurricanes induced by climate change, have heightened risks of major well blowouts and oil spills. The Trump administration worsened these risks by rolling back regulations that had been enacted in response to the 2010 BP oil spill, the largest unintentional spill in the world (as of 2020), and to near misses during the 2013 Shell Arctic expedition. These rollbacks, plus poor government oversight of companies and scant attention to companies’ safety culture, risk a repeat of past oil spill disasters that devastated coastal communities. Members of the bipartisan commission that had investigated the spill reiterated its warnings in 2020 that another major oil spill is simply a matter of time and called for stronger laws governing offshore drilling. A number of congressional members did propose legislation to improve safety in offshore drilling. Unfortunately, despite the shifting tide against offshore drilling in coastal states, the majority of Republicans and those Democrats from states reliant on oil extraction failed to support these initiatives, putting at risk Americans’ lives, livelihoods, coasts and oceans.

Type
Chapter
Information
America's Energy Gamble
People, Economy and Planet
, pp. 253 - 282
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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