Book contents
- Frontmatter
- 1 “Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain”: The Council on Foreign Relations and Germany, 1945–1950
- 2 U.S. Policy on a West German Constitution, 1947-1949
- 3 American Policy toward German Unification, 1949-1955
- 4 Marshall Plan and Currency Reform
- 5 American Policy toward Germany and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1955
- 6 From Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan: America and the Organization of Europe
- 7 Return to Normality: The United States and Ruhr Industry, 1949-1955
- 8 West German Agriculture and the European Recovery Program, 1948-1952
- 9 Science, Technology, and Reparations in Postwar Germany
- 10 American Deconcentration Policy in the Ruhr Coal Industry
- 11 Technology Transfer and the Emergence of the West German Petrochemical Industry, 1945-1955
- 12 The Free University of Berlin: A German Experiment in Higher Education, 1948–1961
- 13 HICOG and the Unions in West Germany: A Study of HICOG’s Labor Policy toward the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1949–1952
- 14 U.S. Military Occupation, Grass Roots Democracy, and Local German Government
- 15 German Democratization as Conservative Restabilization: The Impact of American Policy
- 16 America and the Rebuilding of Urban Germany
- 17 U.S. Policy toward German Veterans, 1945-1950
- 18 Grand Illusions: The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the European Defense Community, 1950-1954
- 19 The Federal Republic of Germany as a “Battlefield” in American Nuclear Strategy, 1953-19
- 20 The Presence of American Troops in Germany and German-American Relations, 1949-1956
- 21 John J. McCloy and the Landsberg Cases
- 22 Sources in German Archives on the History of American Policy toward Germany, 1945-1955
- 23 U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and Related Records: Sources for the History of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1955, in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Marshall Plan and Currency Reform
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2013
- Frontmatter
- 1 “Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain”: The Council on Foreign Relations and Germany, 1945–1950
- 2 U.S. Policy on a West German Constitution, 1947-1949
- 3 American Policy toward German Unification, 1949-1955
- 4 Marshall Plan and Currency Reform
- 5 American Policy toward Germany and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1955
- 6 From Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan: America and the Organization of Europe
- 7 Return to Normality: The United States and Ruhr Industry, 1949-1955
- 8 West German Agriculture and the European Recovery Program, 1948-1952
- 9 Science, Technology, and Reparations in Postwar Germany
- 10 American Deconcentration Policy in the Ruhr Coal Industry
- 11 Technology Transfer and the Emergence of the West German Petrochemical Industry, 1945-1955
- 12 The Free University of Berlin: A German Experiment in Higher Education, 1948–1961
- 13 HICOG and the Unions in West Germany: A Study of HICOG’s Labor Policy toward the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1949–1952
- 14 U.S. Military Occupation, Grass Roots Democracy, and Local German Government
- 15 German Democratization as Conservative Restabilization: The Impact of American Policy
- 16 America and the Rebuilding of Urban Germany
- 17 U.S. Policy toward German Veterans, 1945-1950
- 18 Grand Illusions: The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the European Defense Community, 1950-1954
- 19 The Federal Republic of Germany as a “Battlefield” in American Nuclear Strategy, 1953-19
- 20 The Presence of American Troops in Germany and German-American Relations, 1949-1956
- 21 John J. McCloy and the Landsberg Cases
- 22 Sources in German Archives on the History of American Policy toward Germany, 1945-1955
- 23 U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and Related Records: Sources for the History of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1955, in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This essay describes the double relationship between the Marshall Plan and the West German currency and economic reform of June 1948. Conventional wisdom still maintains that the Marshall Plan was an important condition for the success of the currency reform, which in itself was the starting point of the West German growth story. Even before the currency reform was implemented, the German public viewed foreign credits as an indispensable prerequisite. Therefore all parties placed very high hopes in the Marshall Plan, hopes that almost necessarily were disappointed in part. Arguing from the evidence of such disappointment, Werner Abelshauser has recently repeated his opinion that the direct contribution of the Marshall Plan to economic development in West Germany was relatively insignificant. Moreover, he also questions the importance of the currency and economic reform for the economic recovery. This essay, however, advances a contrary view.
There apparently existed no single, unidirectional causal relationship between the Marshall Plan and the success of the currency and economic reform as well as the high growth rates of the West German economy after the middle of 1948. Rather, one can detect a causality the other way round, between the currency and economic reform and the success of the Marshall Plan in creating the framework for multilateral trade and payments.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994
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