10 - The “blooming” of cooperative federalism: Institutional adaptation to the Europeanization of environmental policy-making in Germany

Summary

The uneven distribution of “say and pay” in European environmental policy-making

The loss of environmental co-decision powers

In Germany the responsibility for environmental policy is strongly decentralized and reflects the functional distribution of labor, which is typical for German cooperative federalism. While legislation has become increasingly centralized at the federal level, the Länder are mainly responsible for implementation. The German Constitution initially assigned the Länder the exclusive responsibility for environmental policy. But most of the Länder competencies became federalized in the 1970s (cf. Müller 1986). The Länder were compensated for the transfer of their competencies to the federal level through the participation of the Bundesrat in federal environmental policy-making. Apart from its co-decision powers in the formulation and decision-making of practically all federal environmental laws, the Bundesrat also has the right to instigate legal initiatives. Thus, the Europeanization of environmental competencies did not cause the Länder to lose any exclusive competencies. But the concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of the member-state governments has reduced the co-decision rights of the Bundesrat from legal initiatives and a veto in the decision-making to, at best, a veto that suspends the implementation of the respective environmental policy. By devaluing the co-decision powers of the Länder, Europeanization has seriously undermined the territorial balance of power in environmental policy-making.

Unlike in domestic policy-making, the Länder have no formal influence on setting the agenda, formulating, and making decisions on European environmental policies.