Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Having it both ways: the gradual wrong turn in American strategy
- 2 Finite counterforce
- 3 Deterrence and the moral use of nuclear weapons
- 4 Escaping from the bomb: immoral deterrence and the problem of extrication
- 5 The necessary moral hypocriy of the slide into mutual assured destruction
- 6 Finite deterrence
- 7 Defending Europe: toward a stable conventional deterrent
- 8 The case for deploying strategic defenses
- 9 Morality, the SDI, and limited nuclear war
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Having it both ways: the gradual wrong turn in American strategy
- 2 Finite counterforce
- 3 Deterrence and the moral use of nuclear weapons
- 4 Escaping from the bomb: immoral deterrence and the problem of extrication
- 5 The necessary moral hypocriy of the slide into mutual assured destruction
- 6 Finite deterrence
- 7 Defending Europe: toward a stable conventional deterrent
- 8 The case for deploying strategic defenses
- 9 Morality, the SDI, and limited nuclear war
- Index
Summary
From start to finish this book has been a product of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. Under the Institute's aegis the need for a book of this unusual kind was understood, the plans for it gradually evolved, thorough discussions of the issues were repeatedly held, and the results were revised – and revised. Loyal colleagues with other agendas of their own – Robert K. Fullinwider, Judith Lichtenberg, David Luban, Douglas MacLean, Claudia Mills, Mark Sagoff, Jerome Segal, and Robert Wachbroit – as well as visiting fellows – C. A. J. Coady, Amy Gutmann, Steven Lee, Richard Mohr, Thomas Pogge, and Ferdinand Schoeman – listened and responded to worried musings about nuclear weapons systems month after month, until “no more nukes” acquired a whole new meaning. Invaluable advice during the initial planning for the research came from Bob Fullinwider and Doug MacLean, as well as from other Maryland colleagues with deep understandings of international security, George H. Quester in the Department of Government and Politics and Catherine McArdle Kelleher in the School of Public Affairs.
All the authors of chapters in this volume except Steven Lee were members of the Institute's multiyear Working Group on Nuclear Policy and Morality, and Lee wrote his own chapter at the Institute as a Rockefeller Fellow during the year after the Working Group's initial meetings. The meetings of the Working Group were also enriched by the contributions of insightful members who did not provide chapters for this book: Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Michael Nacht, Terumasa Nakanishi, and Richard Wasserstrom.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Nuclear Deterrence and Moral RestraintCritical Choices for American Strategy, pp. vii - ixPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1989