Book contents
- Monopsony in Labor Markets
- Monopsony in Labor Markets
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Monopsony in the Labor Market
- 2 The Economics of Monopsony
- 3 Empirical Evidence of Monopsony in Labor Markets
- 4 Antitrust Policy in the United States
- 5 The Intended and Unintended Victims of Monopsony
- 6 Collusion on Wages and Terms of Employment
- 7 No-Poaching Agreements
- 8 Noncompete Agreements
- 9 Unions and Collective Bargaining
- 10 Monopsony and Merger Policy
- 11 Closing Thoughts
- Index
5 - The Intended and Unintended Victims of Monopsony
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 February 2024
- Monopsony in Labor Markets
- Monopsony in Labor Markets
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Monopsony in the Labor Market
- 2 The Economics of Monopsony
- 3 Empirical Evidence of Monopsony in Labor Markets
- 4 Antitrust Policy in the United States
- 5 The Intended and Unintended Victims of Monopsony
- 6 Collusion on Wages and Terms of Employment
- 7 No-Poaching Agreements
- 8 Noncompete Agreements
- 9 Unions and Collective Bargaining
- 10 Monopsony and Merger Policy
- 11 Closing Thoughts
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, we point out that private damage suits are not available to all victims of monopsonistic exploitation. In addition to the underpaid employees who have standing to sue, there are five groups that do not have standing: (1) employees who have been priced out of the market, (2) indirect suppliers of labor services, (3) umbrella employees, (4) suppliers of complementary inputs, and (5) buyers from the cartel.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Monopsony in Labor MarketsTheory, Evidence, and Public Policy, pp. 62 - 80Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024