Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T05:59:56.643Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

17 - Flashbulb and flashback memories

from Part III

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2010

German E. Berrios
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
John R. Hodges
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Get access

Summary

It is an old observation that life events attended by particular emotional or cognitive relevance leave behind ‘images’ or ‘memories’ which may include vivid background detail (normally not remembered) such as colour of clothes being worn at the time, weather conditions, background music, etc., etc. On account of this quality of being like a photograph such recollections have been called ‘flashbulb memories’ (Brown & Kulik, 1977). This metaphor has helped neither the description or understanding of this phenomenon. Equally unhelpful has been the fact that the original research was carried out on parochial American events which may have introduced into the structure of flashbulb memories some social ambiguity.

It is suggested in this chapter that, as far as psychiatry is concerned, ‘vivid personal memories’ should be studied against the wider canvas of other repetitive phenomena of the imagination such as drug flashbacks, palinopsia, palinacusis, tinnitus, post-traumatic memories, and the vivid memories of subjects suffering conditions such as phobias, panic attacks, obsessional disorder, phantom-limb phenomena, and depressive melancholia. The reason for this is twofold: first, that there is little evidence that flashbulb memories are a special phenomenon; secondly, that it is more parsimonious (and in keeping with empirical findings) to think that, like all other mnestic acts, flashbulb memories are also governed by the rules of narrative. The latter is particularly important for the very name of ‘flashbulb memories’ (and the fact that some have been reported as detail-perfect sensory images) may have caused the misleading impression that they: (a) may be impervious to the influence of narrative templates, and (b) constitute clinical evidence against a ‘reconstructivist’ view of memory.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2000

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×