Book contents
- Making a Modern Central Bank
- Studies in Macroeconomic History
- Making a Modern Central Bank
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introductory
- 2 Foreign Fetters
- 3 The Performance of the UK Economy
- 4 The Inexplicable in Pursuit of the Uncontrollable
- 5 ‘A Good Deal of Advice’
- 6 The Long Shadow of the Deutschemark
- 7 Hong Kong
- 8 Shaved Eyebrows
- 9 Tunnelling Deep
- 10 Great Leap in the Dark
- 11 The Spine Theory and Its Collapse
- 12 ‘You Can’t Be In and Out at the Same Time’:
- 13 Horses for Courses
- 14 Failure of Internal Communication
- 15 The New Bank
- 16 Epilogue
- Book part
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
11 - The Spine Theory and Its Collapse
The ERM and the 1990s Recession
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2020
- Making a Modern Central Bank
- Studies in Macroeconomic History
- Making a Modern Central Bank
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introductory
- 2 Foreign Fetters
- 3 The Performance of the UK Economy
- 4 The Inexplicable in Pursuit of the Uncontrollable
- 5 ‘A Good Deal of Advice’
- 6 The Long Shadow of the Deutschemark
- 7 Hong Kong
- 8 Shaved Eyebrows
- 9 Tunnelling Deep
- 10 Great Leap in the Dark
- 11 The Spine Theory and Its Collapse
- 12 ‘You Can’t Be In and Out at the Same Time’:
- 13 Horses for Courses
- 14 Failure of Internal Communication
- 15 The New Bank
- 16 Epilogue
- Book part
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In October 1990, after a sustained campaign from the Treasury, the UK joined the European Monetary System’s Exchange Rate Mechanism. The move was heavily supported by Leigh-Pemberton, who persuaded the US central banker, Alan Greenspan, to persuade Margaret Thatcher that the ERM was a modern version of the nineteenth century gold standard. UK entry into the EMS ERM was accompanied by an interest rate cut, but the consequences of German unification and of German interest rate moves led to tightening of monetary policy at a moment of UK recession. In September 1992, the UK’s exchange rate became unsustainable as very large speculative flows bet on a UK exit from the mechanism (September 16). The result was initially seen as a massive humiliation for the UK and its monetary policy-makers, Black Wednesday, but quite quickly opinion shifted to considering it as a liberation that allowed policy reform, White Wednesday. The UK’s ERM experience thus became a game-changer in thinking about monetary policy and exchange rates.
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- Information
- Making a Modern Central BankThe Bank of England 1979–2003, pp. 267 - 309Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020